In 1987, a small number of historical archaeologists issued a call for archaeologists to embrace the teachings of critical theory so that their research could be used to challenge societal structures of inequality. Although community partnering, an outgrowth of critical theory, has become increasingly important to archaeolog ical practice, a true archaeological "praxis" has yet to be achieved. Possible reasons for this include a decontextualization of critical theory from its historical origin, the subsequent reifi· cation of capitalism in critical lesearch, and the obscuring of agency in critical interpretations because of an emphasis on top down or macIOscale models of society. We suggest that true praxis can be achieved in historical archaeology through a recon ceptualization of the lelationship between individuals and soci ety and through a structuring of archaeological research that seeks to create a discursive relationship between past and pre sent peoples and between researchers and community partners. We present a critically informed archaeological case study from Louisiana to demonstlate how such a dialogue can lead to eman icipatory knowledge.
1. Several individuals have either directly or indirectly contributed to the production of this paper. We arc especially grateful to Rose mary Joyce, who delivered insightful comments as to the style and (see, e.g., Blakey 1987 , the call for a critical archaeology has since been answered by several influential publications (e.g., Handsman and Leone 1989; McDonald et al. 1991;  Pinsky and Wylie '989, Potter '99', 19941 . After a decade the "Annapolis School1/ 2 of historical archaeology is a well-recognized force within the discipline.
To date, the application of critical theory to archae ology has had its most important impacts in the realm of partnerships between archaeologists and the com munities in which they work (e.g., McDavid and Babson '997, Baker '997, BaItoy '999, Derry '997, McDavid 1997, Gibb 1997, Wilkie n.d. a) . Archaeologists are in creasingly considering the political impacts of their re search on descendant populations and the general public. An integral part of this process involves learning how to give a stronger voice to a multitude of archaeological publics (e.g., Franklin 1997b , Hodder '997, LaRoche and Blakey 1997 , Matthews 1997 , McDavid and Babson 1997 , McKee 1994 , Potter 1994 , Wylie 1985 . A growing num ber of archaeologists (e.g., Epperson 1990 , 1999i Franklin T997bi McDavid 1997  Schmidt and Patterson 1995J arc calling upon their colleagues to challenge ideologies that naturalize structures of inequality. Because of the influ ence of the Annapolis School as well as larger social, content of this essay. Meg Conkey proVided valuable guidance and direction in the early development of the project. We thank Ruth Tringham for her thoughtful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Finally, we thank Richard Fox and three anonymous referees for their comments and advice for the improvement of this man uscript. Of course, we take responsibility for any remaining incon sistencies or inaccuracies. 2. In using the term" Annapolis School," we are referring to a ver sion of critical alchaeology that has emerged as part of the" Ar chaeology in Annapolis" Program created by Mark Leone in 1981. This program has produced numerous publications, and many of the original theoretical statements have changed in response to lessons learned over nearly 20 years. While the Annapolis School includes a variety of individual authors, we feel that their theo retical and methodological perspectives are similar enough to in clude within a single category. 747 theoretical, and political movements that have shaped archaeological practice, archaeologists are more criti cally self-aware than perhaps ever before.
The Annapolis School continues to assert a strong in fluence on critical-archaeological practice. Leone (1995 Leone ( , 1999 has continued to call for what he now terms an lIarchaeology of capitalism," while Shackel (1993) , Potter (1991, 1994) , and other scholars associated with the An napolis School (e.g., Little '9940, b) have published aI chaeological studies that promote their viewpoint. The influence of this group of scholars has been so pervasive that many archaeologists and nonarchaeologists alike have come to consider historical archaeology synony mous with the archaeology of capitalism.
While this influence has productively shaped archae ological discourse over the past 20 years, the tendency of the Annapolis School has been to obscure the impor tance of agency in archaeological interpretations. Its clas sical Marxist perspective stresses the forces that shape people's lives rather than the people who both construct and are constrained by them. Adherents of the Annapolis School often fail to problematize such basic concepts as ideology, capitalism, and class. In doing do, they ignore the origins and reproduction of these systems of thought. Ultimately, our criticism rests on the failure of the An napolis School to incorporate the full potential of critical theory into an archaeological praxis. This article aims (I) to demonstrate how critical theory lends itself to a broader consideration of human agency than has been demonstrated in the archaeological literature, (2) to re view and contextualize the roots of critical theory, and (3) to provide a case study that demonstrates our recon ceprualization of a critical archaeology.
Critical Archaeology: Agency Lost?
Inspired by the Frankfurt School of critical theory, Leone, Potter, and Shackel (19871 called for the development of a critical archaeology that would allow archaeologists to follow in the footsteps of sociocultural anthropologists who both had acknowledged the situated nature of their research and were working to effect political change (e.g., Clifford and Marcus 1986, Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, Marcus and Fischer 1986) . While these goals are laudable, many works of the Annapolis School have insisted on the use of value-laden descriptions to delineate "clearly marked" dichotomies: capitalists are oppressors/laborers are exploited; capitalists control/laborers resist. Such characterizations only serve to mask the complex ma nipulation of social relations that develops in the context of capitalism.
Archaeologists such as Leone (1981, 1987, 1988, 1999) argue that many individuals continue to live in capitalist systems because they have been lulled into a sense of false optimism. This "false consciousness" (Leone , 1988 is explained through a notion of ideology as nat uralizing the structural inequalities between the classes (Comaroff and Comaroff '99'; Onner '99', '998, 19991. This conception of ideology is most clearly exemplified in Leone's study of William Paca's garden (1987, 1988, 1995) . While this interpretation was groundbreaking, Le one failed to recognize the possibility that laborers could either pierce the mask of ideology or perhaps not un derstand the language of elite oppression. In the case of William Paca, ideology served to reaffirm his position among his peers rather than to deceive the general pop ulace into a false sense of complacency.
If we were to accept Leone's notion of ideology as rep resentative of the human experience under capitalism, archaeological exploration would be unnecessary. A more interesting avenue of critically informed research might be to explore how agents situate themselves within the capitalist system. Agents can perceive the advantages and disadvantages of capitalism and actively seek to advance themselves within it. Such an approach would further explore the sense of optimism that leads many people to embrace the mythology that hard work is rewarded with social mobility (Ortner 1991 (Ortner , 1999 .
In its interpretive work, the Annapolis School has at tempted lito organize material culture studies that can help pierce or unmask past (or present) ideologies" (Le one, Potter, and Shackel I987:II8). Leone [ , 1988 described William Paca's garden as evidence of a capi talist's trying to naturalize his status as elite through the manipulation of perspective. Focusing on the experi ences of the oppressed lower classes, Mullins (1999a, b) has recently employed similar reasoning to argue that the purchase of bric-a-brac by African-American workers helped them to construct a sense of belonging and pro gress within the capitalist class system that followed emancipation. While both of these case studies attempt to understand the ideological basis for the naturalization of capitalism in nuanced and sophisticated ways, neither adequately situates actors from different classes in dy namic relationships with one another.
Ironically, Leone's strongest application of a critical approach has been his ethnographic analysis of Colonial Williamsburg rather than his archaeological interpreta tion of Annapolis. In this work, Leone (1981) argued that since the modern "reconstruction" presented black workers as subservient to white workers, structures of inequality were shown to be unchanged from the past to the present. In the minds of the visitors, capitalist social relations were naturalized as the way things were, the way things are, and the way things will be. The strength of this study was that Leone drew attention to the relations of power between workers of different clas ses rather than restricting consideration to a single class.
In order to address the lack of agency so apparent in current critical archaeologies, we suggest an approach that more openly considers persons as conscious of the system in which they live and capable, within its struc tural constraints, of pursuing alternative avenues of ac tion. This, of course, is not a new observation (sec, e.g., Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; Ortner 1991 Ortner , 1998 Ortner , 1999 Marcus 1999i Thompson 1978a . To achieve a critical insight into the past, however, these persons must not be viewed as radically independent agents; it is impor tant to consider how they are situated within a web of social relations that define their position in society ICornaroff and Cornaroff '99', Ortner 19911 . In addition to a consideration of socioeconomic class, an analysis of these social relations must include constructions of iden tity such as gender, sexuality, age, race, and ethnicity. While this goal has been articulated by certain scholars of the Annapolis School (e.g., Little '994a, b;  Little and Shackel '989; Shackel t993; Shackel and Little 19921 , the results of their archaeological analyses continue to obscure and dismiss the agendas of subjects and their abilities to construct representations of self that manip ulate and challenge tensions inherent in society.
One of the primary problems in the application of critical theory in archaeology has been a reliance on lltop-down" models of social formation and social change. These models obscure the complexity of rela tionships between individuals and society, thus deny ing any possibility of recognizing social agency on the part of individual actors. Many archaeologists, partic ularly those of the Annapolis School, have typified hu man agents as little more than the passive victims of structural changes, historical forces, and elite ideolo gies. Even more disturbing is the tendency of some ar chaeologists of the Annapolis School to personify ide ologies such as capitalism, seemingly suggesting that they prevent humans from creating individualized iden tities. Leone's 11999:10) statement that "capitalism has been successful and expansive for over four centuries because it constructs and reproduces social relations that resist simplistic analyses ll would imply that cap Italism is beyond the control of human agency-that capitalism, not people, constructs social relations. Iron ically, statements that treat the central role of capital ism in cultural analyses as inevitable and necessary are similar to the ideologies that critical theories seek to challenge.
Following from this critique, the theoretical influ ence of structural Marxism, particularly the work of Alrhusser (19711, should be readily apparent. While Le one 119951 and others (e.g., Leone, Pottel, and Shackel '987, Shackel 19931 have explicitly drawn upon AI thusser's notion of ideology, the Annapolis School owes a deeper and more disturbing debt to this variant of Marxist thought. The abstraction and subsequent nat uralization of categories such as class and capitalism from forms of social being closely approximate the AI thusserian project. As a form of generalization, this type of logic would seem well suited to the goals of a social science, but it is enmeshed in a belief system that ac tively works to destroy human freedom through theo retical practice. In an Althusserian system, individuals exert at best limited influence upon social process, which is dominated by abstract categories and forces and not by individual experience. In a thought-provok ing essay questioning Althusserian logic, the social his torian E. P. Thompson !I978a:I671 offered both critique and solution: 3 J.1t is difficult to express the complexity of Thompson's argument Not only a substantive knowledge, but also the very vocabularies of the human project-compassion, greed, love, pride, self-sacrifice, loyalty, treason, ca lamity-have been beaten down to the circuits of capital. ... At its worst (and this is where it is usu ally at) theoretical practice is this end, and we may thank Althusser for demonstrating this with such " rigour." But if we return to "experience" we can move, from that point, once again into an open ex ploration of the world and of ourselves. This explo ration makes demands of equal theoretical rigour, but within [a] dialogue of conceptualization and em pirical engagement....
Emphasizing the importance of experience and the per son, we propose that the application of critical theory in archaeology would benefit from the injection of the dis cussions regarding agency that have informed other an thropological discourses. A growing number of scholars in archaeology have embraced practice theory le.g., Gilchrist 1994 , Jones '997, Lightfoot, Schiff, and Wake 1997 , Lightfoot, Martinez, and Schiff 1998 , Shennan 1989 , Upton 1996 Wilkie and Farnsworth 19991, partic ularly the work of Pierre Bourdieu [1977, 19901 and his concept of habitus as a means of understanding the con struction of social being and the relationship between material objects and cultural beliefs. Little of this grow ing body of literature has impacted the work of histOrical archaeology's critical theorists.
Bourdieu 11977, 19901 defines the habitus as the sense of cultural propriety and normative order that a person develops through childhood experiences and through everyday practice or action and then uses to impose order on new experiences and domains. What is important about this concept is that it recognizes that people's un derstanding of their cultural environment is uniquely historically situated within their own experiences, thereby avoiding the determinism of structural theories. Artifacts are recognized as situated within cultural ne gotiations and infused with meaning. Further, when the relation between structure and practice is emphasized, it is the artifacts used in everyday life rather than the rare or exotic ones that are likely to be the most impor tant. In this sense, archaeology, with its study of things domestic and discarded, has the opportunity to provide great insight into social being in the past. This approach also removes the need to pinpoint whether an artifact explicitly represents ethnicity, gender, race, class, or some other experience, for a single artifact can have mul tiple levels of meaning to the user and those meanings may be embedded in a number of different cultural ex periences. If any artifact recovered from a site is per ceived as being formed from the habitus, then artifact assemblages can be studied contextually for an under in the form of a single quotat:'on. His essay "The Poverty of Theory" (Thompson 197801 is an essential text for understanding the the oretical weaknesses of structural Marxism and the political impli· cations of this mode of thought. In his words and actions, Thomp son embodies the type of praxis that our argument hopes to attain. standing of how they may have reinforced different senses of self.
The application of the habitus concept is not without its drawbacks. Bourdieu's actors are largely unconscious of the relationship between their actions and the broader cultural tapestry, and therefore their agency is limited. Ortner (t996J has tecognized this aspect of Bourdieu's work. She has subsequently struggled to reconcile the gulf between her own work in practice theory and fem inism by proposing a II serious games" approach that rec ognizes that individuals operate as agents within the constraints of their social and personal contexts and his tories. As does Ortner, we find Bourdieu's jI977, 19901 notion of the habitus invaluable, but we do nOt wish to imply that the presence of the habitus as a structuring principle excludes agency. The habitus, with its uncon scious structuring effects on human action, provides a useful way of conceptualizing normalized use and in teractions with the material culture that has been re covered archaeologically. While material culture can be used in automatic, unconscious ways in the course of everyday life, it is also used in active, expressive, con scious ways. If we do not recognize this duality we risk losing important layers of meaning in our interprctations.
The work of Anthony Giddens (t979, t9841 offers in sight into the dualities of agency and structure as well as the conscious and unconscious aspects of daily life. In his theory of structuration, Giddens (1984:41) intro duced a "stratification model" of human agency based in .the tripartite division of "basic security system" and Jlpractical and discursive consciousness./J This model suggests that human experience is key to understanding the reflexive relationship between structure and agency that dominates social being. It refers directly to aspects of social being formed through routinized, day-to-day en counters that could, if brought into question, be ex plained by individual actors. For the purpose of our ar gument, we will ignore Giddens's notion of the unconscious and focus attention on his division of con sciousness into "practical" and IIdiscursive" forms. While this neglect does injustice to his system of thought, his Jlunconscious" aspects of social being are another form of practical consciousness of the individ ual. Rather than being separate from consciousness, this other, unconscious form of practical consciousness is dif feremiated by the fact that individuals would "not be able to give verbal expression to the promptings of a given action" It984:45J.
In daily life, human actors both reproduce and create practices that are informed by and help to form the Struc tures of social being. Actors in a society are cognizant of these structures in different ways and at different lev els depending upon their personal experience. Giddens's aCtors are nor mere automatons governed by StruCture bur instead both constrained and enabled by structure. Human action may reflect structural considerations, but it is just as likely to manipulate or (re)form those struc tures. In their historical anthropological study of South Africa, Comaroff and Comaroff (1991:291 expand upon Giddens's theory of structuration to propose a chain of consciousness that represents lI a continuum whose two extremes are the unseen and the seen, the submerged and the apprehended, the unrecognized and the cogni zed." Like Giddens, the Comaroffs (p.») recognize that agentive power is situated within "specific historical contexts" and not unlimited. While Giddens's insights concerning this duality of structure are nor necessarily revolutionary/ his concep tualization of a duality of consciousness and intention ality has important implications for the study of daily practice. Bourdieu's habitus is similar to Giddens's 11979, 19841 concept of practical consciousness in that both terms refer, more or less, to less than conscious moti vations for human action. Through the use of both prac tical and discursive consciousness we are able to con front some of the serious limitations to the concept of habitus that we have previously discussed. The key to the duality of structure lies in the ability of actors to provide Jlverbal expression" for their actions [Giddens 1984:45) . Following from this idea, a given actor, asked to give verbal expression for an action, might provide a deep or a superficial explanation depending upon the em beddedness of the structural concepts from which the action derived. While this characterization may sound structurally deterministic, we must recognize that the actor's ability to acknowledge these motivations (or structuresj implies that the actor may manipulate or al ter the structure rather than merely (and unconsciously) following the pattern. The difficulty of expressing this dialectic between structure and agency in static prose should be readily apparent.
In daily practice, individuals place themselves not only in relation to other individuals but also in telation to their material world. We need nOt think only of action and behavior as being part of structurationi our lives are structured by objects, be they buildings, beds, or the pages of CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY. It should be obvious not only that this material world StruCtures individual experience but also that individual experience structures the world. Thus material culture can be perceived both as a sedimentation of structure and as an active manip ulation of structure. The challenge for archaeologists, of course, is to attempt to understand the myriad potential meanings of artifacts within a given context. It is within a given context of experience that the material world acquites meaning.
As the integration of the actions of numerous individ· uals and communities jsuch as groups sharing identities 4. In fact, the consideration of structure and agency or, more broadly, of the individual and society has been a consistent concern of SOCial science even prior to Marx's (1963(18691: 151 often-quoted statement that "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encoun tered, given and transmitted from the past." We believe that some of the most exciting advances in the social sciences are currently being made with the (re)formulation of this classic "problem" (e.g., Barrett 1994; Bender 1998; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; Fox 1991; Johnson 1996; Marcus 1999; Ortner 1996 Ortner , 1999 Sahlins 1981 Sahlins , 1985  Thomas t9961. based on common social-political agendas or shared ex periences of age, race, gender, occupation, or geography), sOCiety operates on a variety of levels and at a variety of scales. Depending upon the situation, individuals may he more or less cognizant of their actions. Given the breadth of important work in anthropological discourses highlighting the dialectical relationships between agency and social constraint, archaeologists should rec ognize that a simple top-down model of society cannot adequately explain the vast majority of interactions in daily life. While individuals arc constrained by many factors beyond their contral, they can seldom be char acterized as mere victims of forces exerted upon them.
A recent example of this type of top-down research is the work of Paul Shackelle.g., 1993). While Shackel does attempt to acknowledge agency, his work suffers from its attribution of omnipotence to capitalism. Focusing on the rise of capitalist ideologies among the gentry of Annapolis, Shackel theoretically situates his research as influenced by Eric Wolf, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bour dieu, Daniel Miller, and Louis Althusser. Although hc recognizes that some of these theorists have failed to deal with agency, the actOr is elusive in his work as well. As Shackel begins to navigate history in Braudelian terms, the agent quickly becomes subsumed by lithe long-term history of etiquette." Although he assures the reader (p. xiii) that "each scale builds on and is dependent on the other scales," he seldom interprets material culture as an independent line of evidence to bolster his histOrical evaluation of the rise of etiquette in the 18th century. Instead, etiquette books are treated as the keystone on which all other forms of data are dependent. Tooth brushes and place settings become simple indicators of the growing influence of surveillance and labor control as industrialization becomes entrenched in Annapolis.
In a paraphrase of Foucault, Shackel writes (p. 21, liThe modern work system and its material by-products create individuals that are predictable, regular, and interchange able." Employing such rhetoric, how could we expect to find expressions of individual agency such as resistance to this disciplinary regime in the archaeological record?
These critiques of the Annapolis School are not new. In his comments on the original CURRENT ANTHROPOL OGY article by Leone, Potter, and Shackel (I987J, Michael Blakey 11987:2921 observed that "the neglect of class di alectics, leaving the role of the capitalist class unexpo sed, undermines the attempt at 'emancipation.'" Blakey went on to say that II critical archaeology, rather than showing real relationships or producing 'less contingent knowledge: can only be expected to yield differently contingent knowledge and relationships." Matthew Johnson [1989, 19991 has long recognized this evident disparity between theory and practice in critical archae ology: "The individual has been triumphantly reinstated at the centre of the stage in theory, but quietly relegated to the wings, or written Out of the script altogether in practice" II989:I90). In the words of a recent critic of the Annapolis School, JlThis leaves us in a position where the only way to characterize the powerful capi talists is as pantomime villains, gleefully tubbing their AND BARTOY A Critical Archaeology Revisited I 7SI hands and cackling as they dispossess the peasantry or mystify a few relationships of inequity" ITariow 1999: 468 ).
Recent archaeological research has led to an emphasis on individual agency beyond class through explorations of ethnicity, race, and gender le.g., Babson 1990 , Ferguson 1992 , SCOtt 1994 , Seifert 1991 , Upton 1996 , Wall 1996 , yet the work of the Annapolis School has failed to incorporate the experiences of women or ethnic and racial minorities in a way that recognizes the unique voices of these individuals Id. Little 1994bl. Ortner 11991, 1998 , Frankenberg 119931, hooks 11992, 1994) , and Brodkin 119981, among many others, have demonstrated that constructs such as race, gender, and ethnicity are not independently constructed and can only be understood in relationship to one another. If critical theory is to make a meaningful contribution to archae ological practice, we must not rely solely on simplistic top-down models of social interaction. We must prob lematize the relationship between the individual and so ciety that is at the heart of a truly critical archaeological practice.
The Annapolis School has demonstrated that critical theory can be a powerful interpretive and emancipatory tool in archaeological practice, but its work suggests that an archaeology of capitalism should deal only with issues of class conflict. In the words of Leone (1999:6) / "stress, conflict, and violence, rather than function, are the cen tral foci of our investigation." Our concern is how a re consideration and retooling of critical theory as em ployed by archaeologists can lead to the creation of a critical archaeology that is more powerful intellectually and politically because it acknowledges the importance of individual action. Though others have recognized this shortcoming of critical archaeology, no one to date has provided a theoretical or methodological means to ad dress this problem.
In the following pages, we will attempt to recontex tualize critical theory within an archaeology of social relations. Throughout this discussion, the importance of human agency will be our driving concern. Because we believe that previous attempts to apply critical theory to archaeology have been hampered by an ahistorical eval uation of its philosophical foundations, we must first resituate critical theory within its historical context.
Critical Theory: A Historical Perspective
The most significant sources of inspiration for critical theory have been the idealist philosophies of Kant and Hegel and the materialist critiques of Marx. An under standing of these foundations is crucial for placing crit ical theory within a historical framework of philosoph ical development. Leone's theoretical perspective (e.g., 1981, 1987, 1988, 1995, 1999) is drawn from the critical theory of this pe riod. Although the ideas of Lukacs Ir9711 concerning alienation and reification were crucial to the subsequent development of critical theory, Leone's reliance on these early works represents a decontextualization of this phi losophy. The ideas from this early period were rather contingent upon their historical milieu. As is exempli fied by the revolution in Russia, the spread of worker's councils throughout Europe, and the rise of industrial unionism in the United States, the early 20th century was characterized by an unprecedented class conscious ness. Leone's neglect of this context makes his appli cation of critical theory to archaeology seem rather ahistorical.
This critique of Leone's work is further justified by a consideration of subsequent developments in critical theory. By the early 1930S the rise of totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union, Germany, and Spain had Iffostered a sense that an emancipatory transformation of the status quo was no longer possible" (Bronner 1994:791. While most of the members of the Frankfurt School moved away from the anti-Semitism and intellectual re pression of National Socialist Germany, they also moved away from their previous commitment to praxis. With the seeming failure of labor and class consciousness, they turned their critique to authority and mass culture. 'I As the concrete social reality changed, so too, Horkheimer and his colleagues argued, must the theoretical construc tions generated to make sense of it"lJay 1973:254). Mem bers of the Frankfurt School infused rheir philosophy with certain aspects of psychoanalysis. The adaptation of Freud's ideas, particularly by members such as Erich Fromm, was made to reformulate the relationship be tween base and superstructure (Jay 1973:941. The Frank fun School became increasingly detached from praxis as well as Marxism.
At the end of World WaIlI, the school once again began to shift its outlook. With the increasing optimism fos tered by the fall of fascism, the evolution of new tech· nologies, and the rise of student movements in Europe and the United States, the younger members, particu larly Herbert Marcuse Ic.g., 19621 , reinvigorated critical theory with a goal of emancipation. In the case of Mar cuse, German Romantics, such as Schiller, inspired an "idealistic turn" toward the freeing of repressed happi ness through lithe truth value of the imagination: the forms of freedom and happiness which it invoke[dl claim [ed] to deliver the historical reality" Ir962:IJSI. Even as students of the revolts of 1968 drew inspiration from the works of Marcuse, other critical theorists of the Frankfurt School remained skeptical of, or, in the case of Adorno, even denied the pOtential of revolutionary praxis. Although this development did not lead to an tagonism between members of the school, as critical the ory entered the modern period it would be characterized by pluralism rather than a unified outlook.
While the Annapolis School has borrowed its ideas mainly from an early period of critical theory, a IIBritish School" of critical archaeology represented most prom inently by Christopher Tilley (e.g., Shanks and Tilley r987a, Thomas and Tilley r9921 and Julian Thomas (e.g., (996) has drawn upon the critical theory of Jurgen Ha bermas and on hermeneutic perspectives. In recent years Leone (1995, 1999) has also drawn on the insights of Habermas in addition to those of Lukacs and Althusser. Although intellectual historians do not consider Haber mas an "official" member of the Frankfurt School, his version of critical theory exhibits a form of praxis that is attuned to the modern world. Both the Annapolis and the British School of critical archaeology have drawn ef fectively on two aspects of Habermas's critical theory: the theory of cognitive interests and the theory of com municative action. In Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas (1971J postulates that the processes of knowl edge acquisition are guided by three basic interests: tech nical, practical, and critical. "Whereas the technical in terest arises from imperatives of a form of life bound to work, the practical interest is anchored in an equally deep-seated imperative of sociocultural life: the survival of societal individuals is linked to the existence of a reliable intersubjectivity of understanding in ordinary language communication" (McCarthy r978:68-69).
Habermas's theory of cognitive interests harks back to a long-standing differentiation in German philosophy between explanation (Erkliirung) and understanding IVer stehen). This division is said to correspond to the dif ference between the natural sciences and the humani ties. Yet, the third knowledge interest, the critical or emancipatory, cannot be considered as distinct from technical and practical interests. "If the social scientist is not to proceed with his head in the sand, he must reflexively take into account the dependence of his con ceptual apparatus on a prior understanding that is rooted in his own sociocultural situation. He must become her meneutically and historically self-conscious" (McCarthy r978:r791. The acquisirion of knowledge should be in· timately linked to critical self-reflection. Since this pro cess cannot separate theory and practice, Habermas stresses the need to "make philosophy participate in the world of action" IBronner 1994:291).
Critical archaeologists have taken advantage of this call to praxis in their critiques of knowledge production. The claims of Habermas have been used primarily as suppOrt for the postpositivist critique of objectivity. As Thomas and Tilley (1992:107) pointed Out, IIHabermas has denounced positivist 'scientific' research strategies as being part of a repressive ideology of technological control in late capitalist society.1I If all knowledge claims are subject to knowledge-constitutive interests, claims of objectivity are dangerous delusions. For this reason, critical self-reflection is not merely a choice of research ers but a necessary step for any piece of research. "Self reflection is at once intuition and emancipation, com· prehension and liberation from dogmatic dependence" (Habermas 1971:w8) .
According to Habermas, the quest for emancipation and liberation must begin with the achievement of un distorted communication. In his theory of communica tive action he has attempted lito ground the philosophy of history within a general anthropological vision of which the philosophy of language is the primary com ponent" (Bronner 1994:300) . For anthropologists ac quainted with the structuralist approaches of de Saussure and Levi-Strauss, this "linguistic turn" is immcnsely ap pealing. Habermas (1971:314-15) identified the institu tionalization of domination in the reproduction of dis torted communication: "Only when philosophy dis covers in the dialectical course of history the traces of violence that deform repeated attempts at dialogue and recurrently close off the path to unconstrained com munication does it further the process whose suspension it otherwise legitimated: mankind's evolution toward maturity IMundigkeit)." Individuals must work to create a dialogue in which all participants are treated as equals. As Leone 1I995:2531 summarizes, this type of dialogue has four characteristics: "intelligibility, honesty, legiti macy, and believability."
In recent years, however, the British School of critical archaeology has reacted against the inherent idealism of Habermas's reliance on a concept of undistorred com· munication. Thomas (1993a:I2-13) has criticized his no tion of an "ideal speech situation" as grounded in an idea of "false consciousness" that allows one to conSIder it possible for subjects to II wipe away the ideological dis tortions and come to know their own true interests." In OPPosition to this line of reasoning, Thomas has stressed the impossibility of "an objective knowledge of reality" because of the plurality of possible meanings constructed by participants within a discourse.
Although we also find Habermas's notion of this ideal speech situation overly idealistic, adoption of a modified version of his idea has produced pOSitive results in ar chaeology. As archaeologists continue to confront the objectivist delusions of positivist research, the inherent sociopolitical nature of the discipline has become in creasingly explicit. As McGuire (1994:182) has empha sized, "If we recognize that the pasts we study are the pasts of living communities, then we must also recog nize an obligation to serve the interests of these com munities." In doing this, some archaeologists have stressed the need to create a IIdialogue among equals" (Leone 1995:253) . We believe that the most encouraging examples of this praxis are found in the "Working To gether" column of the Society for American Archaeology Bulletin (e.g., icholas 19971, where productive partner ships have been forged between Native American com munities and archaeologists. While few of these reports draw explicit theoretical insight from Habermas or the Frankfurt School, the incorporation of critical thought processes into their research programs is a positive step.
Having situated critical theory within its historical context and examined its recent applications in archae ological discourse, we would like to offer a reformulation of critical-archaeological practice that stresses the im portance of social relations and human agency. We must recognize, however, that our knowledge claims concern ing the past are fundamentally mediated by our privi leged positions as scholars in the present. In the follow ing discussion, we hope to bridge the contentious divides between past and present, theory and practice.
The Nature of Agency in Capitalist Systems
Archaeologists have defined capitalism in a variety of ways (e.g., Delle 1998, Leone 1995, Leone and Potter 1999 , McGuire 1992 , McGuire and Paynter 1991 , Orser 1996 . Those inspired by Marx have explicitly unde1 scored the importance of material things in these defi nitions. As would be expected of anthropologically rooted scholars, they usually consider social relations a key component of an analysis of capitalism, but discus sions of class preempt any detailed considerations of hu man agency. Furthermore, the construction of class, a process that would seem to involve the actions of knowl edgeable human agents, seldom receives more than a generalized and depersonalized afterthought. In a recent definition of capitalism, James Delle (1998:25 Jhas stated:
Capitalism is a political economy characterized by a type of stratified social structure in which human relationships are defined by membership in and alle giances to social classes. Membership in capitalist social classes is defined by an individual's ability and opportunity to accumulate wealth. These abili ties are directly related to the control of strategic re sources through individual ownership of private property, including the tools, knowledge, and raw materials required to produce commodities for exchange. Under the capitalist system a small elite owns and maintains control over these means of production, while a majority of the population is re quired to work for these owners-either by having their labor power coerced from them through the in stitution of slavery, or through the necessity of sell ing their labor power to the owners for a wage. (1998:27) disagrees with Wolf's contention that "the capitalist mode of production emerged only when both the means of production and labor power became commodities for sale in markets," instead recognizing mercantile capitalist and competitive capitalist modes of production as historical variants of capitalism. This allows him to argue that the use of slave labor does con stitute a capitalist system. Delle favors Wallerstein's sug gestion that slavery be considered a "form of labor ex traction compatible with wage labor within a larger capitalist world economy"lp. 251. While we would agree that slavery cannot be considered incompatible with a capitalist economy, we wonder what exactly could be considered a precapitalist one. Do the roOtS of capitalism reach deeper into both mercantile and feudal forms of labor? If so, could not the Roman empire be characterized as a capitalist "regional" economy?
This exercise is illustrative of the (ab)use of much the ory in archaeology, Marxist or other. Instead of helping us to interpret the complexities of the past, theoretical categories such as capitalism and class are used to com promise the IIcontinuities and dialectics of life, the in terpersonal and intimate aspects of social settings that bind lives . into social patterns" IConkey and Cero 1991:15). While many scholars would fundamentally agree that class is an "imposed" rather than a "real" category, many archaeologists fall into the lrap of trying to recognize class in the material culture of the past. A crucial dislinction exists between class as category and class as lived experience (Hobsbawm 1971i Thompson 1978a hI. As it is usually employed, class is a category imposed by an external observer rather than being "de_ fined by men as they live their own history" (Thompson 1963:111. Thus, the role of the researcher is to identify class as a moment of being evident in the behavior-the thoughts and actions-of individuals. Yeti while class may be a crucial component of social being in certain situations, it is unlikely that it is the sale determinant of human action.
Ortner has argued that class operates in society as both an identity constructed by individuals and a structure that is IIreal" within it. With this in mind, we must attempt to recognize the multiplicity of dialogues in formed not only by gender, sexuality, race, etc., but also by a consciousness that may only be recognized in the (reJactions of individuals. Ortner 11991, 19981 has iden tified class as one of the great unspoken discourses in American society, observing that vocabularies of class in the United States often become enmeshed in discourse on gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and race.
Through the following discussion and case study, we would like to offer a definition of capitalism. Our defi nition is based not in an abstract realm of class and ide ology but in a more concrete world that emphasizes the primacy of social relations and agency. Recent attempts (e.g., Wurst 1999, Wurst and Fitts 1999) to Ireldefine class have recognized the importance of a "relational" rather than a "gradational" (Wurst and Fitts 1999:1 Iview. While this (rejdefinition has stressed that class must be viewed as coming-in to-being rather than essentially preexisting, the role of the individual has been disregarded in the process. If we are to (re)center a definition of capitalism or class in the realm of social relations, it is critical to recognize that social relations are made up of the com munications and actions of individuals. Therefore, in or der to problematize the concept of capitalism, we must turn to a traditional philosophical question: What is the fundamental relationship between the individual and society~ Societies are formed through the inseparable combi nation of two forms of social relations: the relationship between individuals and their "worlds" and the rela tionship between individuals and other individuals. Since each of these relations will affect the other in the course of time, it is problematic to attempt to make either analytically distinct. How people interact with their world may impact their interactions with others as much as their interactions with others may influence their outlook upon their world. Yet, a fundamental as pect of the divorce between Marxist perspectives on the past and perspectives that are more "humanistic" has been the differential emphasis on one of these relations. While Marxists (e.g., Leone '995, 1999; Little 1994a, b; McGuire 1992; Orser 1987 Orser , '988a, b, 1996 Paynter and McGuire 1991; Potter 1994; Shackel 19931 tend to pro mOle the relation between individuals and the world through such concepts as value and alienation, "human istic" scholars le.g., Hodder 1986,1991; Shanks and Til ley 1987i Spector 1991; Thomas 1993b Thomas , 1996 Yentsch and Beaudry 19921 emphasize the role of the autonomous individual in shaping the social world. We suggest that the social world is formed nOt by one of these means alone but instead by a complex combination of both.
Perhaps it is simplistic to say that how people relate to each other is fundamental to understanding the cre ation and transformation of social systems. Yet, it would seem that some scholars inspired by Marx tend to treat important concepts such as age, race, and gender as if they were mere veils that disguised the "real" prime mover of history, class. If we want to understand self identification and group perception in the past, we must be willing to combine the perceptions of Marx with the insights of the present. Critical theory teaches us that reliance on orthodoxy is the death of thought. In the words of the old master, "proletarian revolutions criticize themselves constantly, interrupt themselves continually in their own course, come back to the ap parently accomplished in order to begin it afresh, deride with unmerciful thoroughness the inadequacies, weak nesses and paltriness of their first attempts" IMarx 1963[ 18691: I 9) .
Rather than relying on essentialist categories such as class, race, or gender, we approach capitalism from the perspective of situational behaviors and shifting social relations. The key to our definition lies in the partici pation of individuals in the world. Previous definitions of capitalism have stressed the distinctiveness of social relations in modern capitalist societies. While many of these definitions differentially emphasize the role of pri vate property, labor, and accumulation, what links all of them seems to be a concept of exploitation. Capitalist social relations are viewed as essentially exploitative in a fundamentally different way from social relations in precapitalist societies. Yet, when viewed in terms of ex plonation, the totality of the human past could be con ceptualized as a "continuum of capitalism," with the last epoch having exhibited only a quantitative rather than a qualitative difference from earlier ones. In terms of social relations, the evident distinction may be not so much between capitalist and precapitalist as between, for lack of better terms, /lmodern" and "premodern."
From the perspective of European history, the modern emerged from its premodern or medieval origins in a context of complex social change that encompassed the totality of human experience. While scholars place dif ferential significance on specific changes in the political, economic, religious, and cultural spheres of early modern society, we believe that none of these spheres can be considered as a singular causal variable in the transition to the modern. Indeed, it was the complex interaction of individuals with their world and with each other that led to this dynamic period of change. Capitalism, as a world economic system, is traditionally considered one of the major transitions of this period (e.g., Braudel IgBI; Wallerstein 1974 Wallerstein , 1980 , but it should nOt be viewed as monolithic. Capitalism describes a certain sort of social relation that has emerged in the modern world but remains in different forms and different guises vary ing not only with differenr historical periods but also with different geographical regions. Capitalism is not a "haunt" (Orser 1996 :571. It is created by individuals yet retains a certain sort of power beyond them. What is crucial is that capitalism cannot exist apart from human agency.
While many Marxist scholars tend to label the primacy of the individual as a bourgeois ideology in capitalist society, we feel that a recognition of the dialectical re lationship between the person and society is crucial to a better understanding of the complexities of social life. It is difficult to put this dialectic into words without destroying its fluid and situational nature. Yet, if we are to admit that the person is "an ensemble of social reo lations" IHeilbroner 1980:461, we must also realize that social relations are an ensemble of human actions in the world. Godelier 11986:671 succinctly expressed this point in his recognition that "history is the product of an en counter between these two logics, between these twO sets of intentional and unintentional forces, between the conscious action of human beings-which often breaks off and sometimes achieves its aim-and the uninter rupted action of the properties of their relations, an ac tion lacking intention and properties with a goal." While this conception refuses ro deny the realiry of the person, it does not fall into the bourgeois trap of considering the individual person ultimately atOmistic and unsocial.
In trying to understand social systems, we must rec ognize both the horizontal and the vertical aspects of individuals in their social worlds. If we consider social relations as a horizontal aspect that links individuals across a landscape, we must also recall that each indi vidual is also constituted by a vertical aspect, that is, a personal history, in part formed by other relations in which the individual may not be currently enmeshed. While this conceptualization may be criticized as a re turn to particularism, this is an "exploded" particular ism, since the web of human relations will extend ad infinitum if we consider both its horizontal and its ver tical aspects. Since we recognize personal histories and intentions, the determining role of social relations will exhibit great variability. It is this totality of human var iability that anthropology as a holistic discipline is best situated to study.
The greatest difficulty comes in trying to express these contested complexities of social life in a static medium such as prose. The notions that we refer to as "class," "race/' "gender," and "ethnicity" merely serve to label discrete sets of social relations that situate individuals in various ways. They represent social relations that can disenfranchise as well as empower, liberate as well as constrain. Materially, these social relations may be ev idenced in architecture, material culture, and the built environment. These are not arenas of human identity that can be separated from the political economy. "The social division of labor that is manifested and reproduced in the spatial division of labor is not likely to be acci dental. Instead, it is likely rooted in gender-, age-, and group-or class-based differences in opportunity, which depend upon the way in which the dialectics between practice and social structure have been played out within that place" IPted 1984:2831.
Social actors are conscious of these empowering and constraining aspects of social relations to differing de grees. We must be cautious of interpretations that pro pose the existence of realities that are not socially con structed. Instead, ideologies can lead to the construction of multiple social realities. Through the recognition of ideologies that construct and reinforce inequities in the social realities of certain populations, critical archae ology can help lead to an emancipatory knowledge of the present through an illumination of the past. "By illu minating the past, [theoretical productions of Marxism or Marxist perspectives] enlighten mankind as to its her itage: they reveal elements of history congealed in the present; they open consciousness to wholly unsuspected aspects of social existence. Thus, they change the terms by which we accept the present, and thereby change our ability to shape the future" (Heilbroner 1980:80) . Yet, the process of constructing emancipatory knowledge is not one-sided. Actors participating in a social system are every bit as capable as outsiders of recognizing masking ideologies. It is important to eliminate the interpretive privilege of the outsider and support a more discursive relationship between insider and outsider. Working roo gether, insiders and outsiders can collectively construct understanding, ultimately enabling emancipatory action.
The nature and degree of collaborative interaction be tween informants and researchers-between archaeolo gIsts and descendant groups or between archaeologists and "publics"-has been the subject of some debate le.g., Derry r997, LaRoche and Blakey 1997 , McDavid and Babson 1997 , McKee 1994 . "Community parmering" and I/public outreach" have become catchwords in his torical archaeological discussions. In practice, however, whtle descendant communities may be involved in in itial research design and perhaps consulted during the process of interpretation, with few exceptions (e.g., Derry 1997, Edwards-Ing1am 1997, LaRoche and Biakey 1997J these interactions seldom inform archaeological prac tice. We will present a case study that demonstrates a way in which a critical approach can use the archaeol ogist-informant dialectic to construct critical-archaeo logical narratives.
Class Fluidity, Material Culture, and the Lileworld Individuals act as constrained agents within society, thus creating, renewing, and contesting the relations that sit uate then"l in their social context. Habermas uses the term "lifeworld" (Lebenswelt! to describe the collection of behaviors, expectations, norms, and communicative acts that constitute daily life and link individuals. In his view, individuals interpret their surroundings through the observation and analysis of social action. In any given social situation, actors turn to their personal experiences to determine how they will navigate the social land scape. Individuals engaged in communicative action have many options, and through their choices culture is constantly renewed and re-created. The nuances of sym bolic communication are learned from infancy onward, and life experiences shape the person's social vocabulary. While Habermas speCifically deals with linguistically conveyed communicative action, we, among others (e.g., Thomas I993b), see material culture as another medium through which communicative meanings can be con veyed. Through daily experiences, the practices of the lifeworld become normalized, but, as Habermas I1984: 171 points out: "the traditionality of those who partici pate in this communicative practice is determined by whether if necessary, they could, under suitable circum stances, provide reasons for their expressions." This idea mirrors Giddens's concept of practical and discursive consciousness.
In order to conceptualize the lifeworld, we draw upon a notion of community. While "community" as lived experience relates to a self-identification or a conscious ness "community" as an analytical category is imposed as an abstraction in an attempt to clarify the motivations of a group. If the abstraction is to be meaningful, the analytical category should include aspects of the lived experience, but the lived experience will never be re ducible to the analytical category. In our example, the lived experience of community is best demonstrated among the descendants (broadly definedJ of Oakley Plan tation. In trying to move from the present to the past, we also attempt to tease out the lived experience of the historical community of Oakley Plantation. However, the fragments of the past available to us fail to reveal consciousness or self-identification, and therefore we must impose our analytical category. In doing so, we hope that our abstraction does not do violence to the nuances of lived experience. This must always be con sidered a necessary danger of the process of abstract thinking.
The definition of what constitutes a "descendant" community has been much debated in a number of con· texts (e.g., Erlandson et al. 1998 1 Haley and Wilcoxon '997, La Roche and Blakey '997, O'Connor 1989) . While it is easy to base a definition on self-identification, this often leads to conflict between competing interests within descendant communities and frequently places the anthropologist in a position of validating the "au_ thenticity" of one group or the other. As Erlandson et al. [1998:484) have suggested in relation to anthropoio gists and Native Americans, II Anthropologists should not act as the sole arbiters of truth and justice, the di viners of who is or is not Indian, or the creators of sim plistic stereotypes that exacerbate factionalism." There are multiple communities, and there is no overarching formula for success in incorporating them into a single research program (Derry I997J. Archaeologists must be willing to decenter themselves as authorities and allow interested communities to engage in their own negoti ations of identity construction in relation to any given site or ancestral population. This does not, however, im ply an unmitigated relativism that would treat all claims as equally valid. Claims of authority and identity can be evaluated by all participants through communication which makes their foundations manifest. In this way, we may reach a "truth" in the sense of "letting-something be·seen" rather than as an agreement among individuals IHeidegger r962[19271:56J.
The work currently under consideration occurred dur ing the early 1990S, when debates regarding the role of community partners were still new in historical archae ology. Wilkie undertook to identify and contact former occupants and descendants of the plantation commu nities of two Louisiana plantations. These plantations, located in parishes separated by the Mississippi River, were being investigated concurrently. African-American communities were incorporated through oral history in terviews, lectures, public outreach events, and other vol· unteer efforts in Baton Rouge, Pointe Coupe, and West Feliciana parishes. The project was conceptualized as a cooperative effort including a broad range of individuals whose life experiences involved the sites being studied, as well as others who felt that they shared a heritage with the families being studied archaeologically.
It was through the narratives of community partners who had lived at these plantations from the early to the mid-1900S that the issues to be explored were recognized. These individuals helped to frame research questions and aided in the interpretation of materials. Since individuals had different perceptions of their communities' pasts, their views were incorporated into multivocal interpre tations. As excavation, analysis, and interpretation pro gressed, dialogues regarding the meaning and implica tions of the data were instructed with a broader representation of the descendant community, including African-American scholars, individuals who identify themselves as inheritors of the plantation legacy. This synthesis therefore represents a broader range of input than might be obtained solely from direct descendants and former plantation occupants. The IreJdeflnition of panners is not a dilution of the descendant input but a response to their direction that the research be used to challenge the African-American community, in its broadest sense, to consider the com plexities of the plantation period. In this situation, the greatest concern of the direct descendants has been that their history not be ignored and that the research con sider the importance of the bonds between families cre ated on plantations and why these bonds were lost. While interested in helping to explain specific materials as well as revealing memories of plantation life, these persons were uncomfortable with extending their participation to the realm of interpretation. This relationship is dif ferent from the proactive relationship between archae ologists and community partners that has developed dur ing the analysis and interpretive phase of the African Burial Ground Project in New York (Epperson 1999, LaRoche and Blakey r9971and probably reflects the dif ferent political, social, and economic experiences of the twO descendant populations. One of the emancipatory implications of this research has been to emphasize that individuals have a right to inject their voices into his torical discourses to keep their experiences from being devalued, lost, or rewritten by others.
While the community partners were broadly defined as we have JUSt shown, the historical community under study had to be identified in a different manner. With the assistance of the descendant community, in con Junction with historical documentation and archaeolog Ical remains, Wilkie was able to gain a sense of a his torical community at Oakley. Informants were explicit about the way in which they conceived their commu nity. From day to day, individuals were involved in face to-face interactions with other occupants of the plan talion during the course of work, school, barter, and worship. Informants particularly emphasized the impor tance of church membershipi new families were ex pected to join Mt. Pilgrim Church, which served the members of Oakley's tenant populations as well as the families that had left. They indicated that the vast ma jority of their social interactions were with other people living on the plantation.
Expanding upon informants' notions of this historical community, census and plantation records indicated that sharecropping families were surprisingly stable at Oak ley, with a number remaining on the plantation for sev-AND BAR TOY A Critical Archaeology Revisited 1757 eral generations. Families maintained some contact with other families who had moved to other plantations, and some kin alliances were formed through marriage across plantations. Likewise, during ventures to the local towns, people built additional webs of social relations. These social networks created an extended community for the African-American population of the plantation that included part of the white population of the area. Oral histories indicated that African-Americans saw their employers as their representatives with regard to the white community-as persons who could protect or endanger them. In contrast to the situation in parts of Appalachia, where white sharecroppers were not uncom mon, in these conon parishes color differences closely paralleled class differences, with African-Americans oc cupying the lowest economic, politicat and social levels of society. Local papers embraced white supremacism, and racial violence was employed as a means of rein forcing the racial hierarchy. Ultimately, it was typically the other members of the African-American plantation community to whom individuals turned in times of ec onomic or emotional distress.
Beyond the plantation, the people of Oakley were more indirectly involved in the broader economic, political, and social communities that extended to the state, the region, the nation, and the world. While it is easy to conceptualize the incorporation of the products of labor into a larger system, the historical community at Oakley may also have identified itself as a member of these larger networks. Through media such as newspapers, magazines, and mail-order catalogs and material culture, the African-American population of Oakley was also em bedded within a more imagined but no less real com munity as hopeful consumers, exposed to a world of gen tility and the American dream of upward mobility (Mullins 1999a) . Situated within these multiscalar webs of relations, with their constraints, conflicts, and pos sibilities, the African-American population of Oakley Plantation negotiated the routines of everyday life. For the purpose of our discussion, we focus our analysis upon "community" as seen through the experiences of a single family at this plantation. While our analytical category encompasses aspects of the lived experience, for the sake of brevity, our analysis is confined to an "unreal" specificity.
Following emancipation, formerly enslaved African Americans found themselves situated in a foreign eco nomic arrangement that stripped them of the limited personal safety and economic security previously af forded by the value of their bodies to the slaveholders IMaguire r975, MandIe r983, Moody r9681_ For those who remained in the agricultural South, tenancy, espe cially sharecropping, ultimately served to entwine many African-American families in a painful and seemingly inescapable cycle of increasing debt (Adams 1980 , Adams and Smith 1985 , Maguire 1975 . Discus sions with former plantation workers and their descen dants have revealed that this period of life on the plan tation remains an important component of many African-American families' narratives (Wilkie n.d.ai. Many members of the descendant communities saw Wilkie, a university instructor, as a vehicle for educating younger generations of African-Americans. Many stressed how important it was for their children and grandchildren to understand how hard life had been and how much progress they had made. Intimately tied to these narratives of success were stories about commu nity strength: the importance of ethnic solidarity, mu tual dependence, religious faith, and commitment to ed ucation (Wilkie n.d.a). Over and over again, Wilkie heard from different community collaborators about the efforts of various tenant populations to maintain and improve educational opportunities for their communities and to support one another financially in times of hardship and illness. The proud stories of escape from an oppressive economic regime were always paired with nostalgia for the sense of community that had endured and, to their minds, was missing from contemporary society. Oral his tory, intended to clarify artifact interpretation, in fact was a critical practice through which descendant com munities made the archaeological findings part of their own discursive consciousness. A renewal of this sense of community was often suggested by community part ners as a means of saving imperiled elements of African American society. The community clearly had an un derstanding of the factors that had contributed to its emancipation from the economic situation of the plan tation and wanted that understanding to be communi cated through the archaeology of plantation life.
It is important to note, at this juncture, that the in corporation of community partners into this kind of re search is not undertaken so that descendants can have archaeologists wri te histories of their pasts that sui t their current self-images or political needs. Instead, working with community partners allows researchers to recog nize that there are issues and questions regarding the past that are important to descendants, including those who do not necessarily correspond to the intellectual fads of the academy. The discursive relationship between archaeologist and informant not only challenges the ar chaeologist to consider different research avenues and interpretations but also challenges the descendants, through the interpretive process, to reflect upon their understandings of their history.
While the community's understandings of its past have been a vital part of interpreting archaeological re mains for the broader public, they have raised other im portant questions for critical consideration. How did the process of acquiring freedom from the plantation ulti mately extinguish the sense of community that had made it possible? How did the lifeworld change so rad ically as to be unrecognizable to its inhabitants? This question shaped archaeological consideration of two gen erations of a single African-American family whose members made the transition from tenant to wage labor.
Silvia Freeman and her husband, Lewis, worked as sharecroppers throughout their marriage. Married in 1870, they had nine children, five of whom lived beyond infancy. By the time that Lewis died, sometime around 1885, their oldest children, John and Joe, had entered their teens, experienced in the lifeworld of the share cropping community. A young widow with five children, Silvia Freeman seems to have caught the attention of the spinster owners of Oakley Plantation, Lucy and Ida Mat thews. Silvia was given the position of cook and moved from the quarters to a house near the planter residence. During her adult life, Silvia Freeman would experience the heigh t of racial violence in Louisiana between the end of Reconstruction and the institution of the Jim Crow laws. The opportunities for employment for Af rican-American workers in rural West Feliciana parish were limited to share-farming, the timber industry, and, for the lucky few, service positions in the homes of white families. Essentialist racial notions held by the white community shaped the economic, educational, social, and political opportunities available to the African American community. Archaeological investigations have allowed for new insights concerning this period of change in the life of Silvia Freeman, as she operated as a constrained individual in a volatile racial landscape (Wilkie '994a, b, t995, '996, '997, n.d.a, b,  cl· Silvia Freeman's occupational shift to cook repre sented an important economic advancement for her fam ily. She now worked for wages rather than credit. In 1890 she was the highest-paid wage worker on the plantation, earning $4.00 a month. In addition to the advantages of earning wages, proximity to the planter family provided other material benefits, such as hand-me-down ceramics and glassware from the planter family. The common practice of "toting" (taking home the remainders of the planter's meals) lessened food expenses. These advan tages are all evidenced in the archaeological record. While these relations between the Freeman and the Mat thews families were an important aspect of Silvia's new position, a striking feature of the archaeological assem blage associated with her was the degree to which she maintained ties to the sharecropping community (Wilkie 1994a (Wilkie , 1995 (Wilkie , 1996 (Wilkie , 1997 . Archaeological data clearly demonstrate that she participated in bartering transactions with the sharecropping community, provid ing tenants who lived on credit with an alternative source of goods (Wilkie 1994Q , n.d.b) . Archaeological ev idence also suggests that she continued to rely upon eth nically distinct medical and magical practices that tied her to the community (Wilkie 1994a (Wilkie , 1996 . Doc umentary evidence demonstrates that participation in the community church was important to Silvia and that the church-run school educated her children.
The children of Silvia and Lewis Freeman were all eventually employed in some manner by the planter fam ily. John worked as a yard hand until he married and moved back to the quarters of Oakley Plantation as a sharecropper. Joe worked as the carriage driver until, fol lowing his brother's lead, he married and began to farm a plot of land. Thus, these brothers reentered the life world of their parents, forsaking the economic advan tages of life in the planter's house for the community of their childhood. Their lifestyle greatly contrasts with that of their sisters, Delphine and Eliza. During their childhood, Silvia Freeman's th,ee youngest children, Eliza, Delphine, and Christinc/ also worked for thc planter/s family. Unlike their brOthers, however, the three sisters were employed in the plantcr's residence. As part of their interactions with the planter family, the Freeman family received a variety of hand.me·downs/ among them white-faced porcelain dolls and numerous tea sets. Not only did these toys expose the children to the material trappings of the upper classes, but they also encouraged play revolving around domesticity and ser· vice (Wilkie '994b, n.d.cl . These younger daughte,s had nOt experienced the lifeworld of the sharecropping com· munity for any memorable length of their lives. Instead, the lifeworld in which they were enmeshed was a dual world of COntrast between their mother's former life and rhe examples set before them by the planter family. The value orientations internalized by the younger Freeman children were drawn [rom these conflicting worlds.
Habermas (1987:169) has written that lion the basis of an increasing sharp dichotomy between high and popular cultures, classes develop their own milieus, lifeworlds, and value onentations specific to the various strata. II For at least two of the Freeman daughters, Delphine and Eliza jChristine Freeman has nOt been traced further his· toricallYI, the lifeworld of the household servant became their sale realm of experience. After Silvia's death, they continued to live in their mother's house, working reo spectively as cook and house servant. Their occupations clearly placed them in a social class distinct from that of the farming families. The archaeological record shows less evidence for them than for their mother of the main tenance of ethnic practices that would have tied them 1O the broader community (Wilkie 1994a (Wilkie , 1995 (Wilkie , 1996 . The sisters placed greater emphasis on mass·pro duced medical goods. Little evidence exists for a cantin· uation of their mother's magical practices, and there is no evidence of bartering with the tenant community. The tablewares, clothing, and dietary remains from the site demonstrate the sisters' increasing participation in the material world of the planter family. Delphine and Ehza even had access 1O such luxury items as a phonograph.
The sisters' upward mobility had consequences for the way in which they were perceived within the broader African-American community of the plantation. Several former Oakley tenants who had known Eliza and Del phine, as well as John and Joe Freeman, had not realized that the four were siblings (Wilkie n.d.c) . Oral histOry also indicates that the closest friend of the sisters was the wife of another wage worker. Aside from this rela tionship, the sisters seem to have been relatively isolated from the remainder of the African·American commu nity, not to mention the communicative acts that made up its lifeworld. While they may have improved their material st.anding over that of the sharecroppers of the community, the labor arrangement in which they lived served to lsolate them socially. The structure of domestic service, its time demands, and its geographic isolation limited the possibility of interactions with not only sharecroppers but also other wage workers. In the racially segregated world of the postbellum South, the sisters may have achieved greater financial autonomy than pos sible under sharecropping, but they did so at the expense of social relationships within the local community.
With their participation in the lifeworld of domestic service, the Freeman sisters accepted a form of labor ar· rangement not available to the sharecropping commu· nity. While sharecroppers were still largely involved in subsistence agriculture, domestic servants were selling their labor and, as a result/ were severed from their for· mer lifeworld. We characterize the experience of the Freemans as typical of individuals who become incor· porated into capitalist organizations (Habermas 1987: 3 0 91:
Organizations nOt only disconnect themselves from cultural commitments and from attitudes and orien· tat ions specific to given personalitiesj they also make themselves independent from lifeworld can· texts by neutralizing the normative background of informal, customary/ morally regulated contexts of action. The social is not absorbed as such by organ ized action systemsj r3ther, it is split up into spheres of action constituted as the lifeworld and spheres neutralized against the lifeworld.
It can be argued that one cost of capitalist social relations is the destruction of IItraditional forms of life" (Haber mas 1987:3211. The Freeman sisters had other options than to pursue a life of domestic service. Their brothers provided them an entree into the tenant community. While reinforcing ties to lateral kinship networks and community, such an option would also have tied them to an oppressive labor regime. The oppressive labor struc tures of the postbellum South forced families into a par adoxical situation: to take advantage of the economic improvements made possible by the lifeworld of their community/ they had to contribute to the destruction of that lifeworld.
To understand the possible motives of individuals like the Freeman sisters, who seemingly abandoned their families and communities in exchange for the commo dification of their labor/ we must consider the other kinds of relationships that bound these women. We have previously suggested that individuals sometimes will ingly participate in capitalist systems, embracing an ide· ology that promises that hard work will be rewarded with social mobility and improvement in the quality of life. One means of evaluating social mobility is through a consideration of one's ascending and descending kinship relations. In part, the experiences of their mother, her elevation to the position of most trusted and highly paid servant on the plantation/ would have served as authen· tication of capitalist ideology for the sisters.
Sherry Ortner (I99I:17IJ writes, "Because hegemonic American culture takes both the ideology of mobility and the ideology of individualism seriously, explanations for non mobility not only focus on the failure of individ· uals (because they are said to be inherently lazy, or stupid or whatever), but shift the domain of discourse to arenas that are taken to be 'locked into' individuals-gender, race, ethnic origin, and so fonh." Therefore, as the Free man sisters became more immersed in the discourse and ideologies of American capitalist society, they would have perceived the economic hardships of the share croppers and other tenants not as the result of the struc tures of racism that had created the economic system but as due to individuals' shortcomings. Perhaps they perceived the sharecroppers' inability to advance eco nomically as the result of their "backward" cultural val ues-thus validating their own decision to sever their ties to theIr lifeworld.
Pan of the ideology of capitalism is the belief that children will be more successful than their parents. [n this light, the transition to wage labor, even at the COSt of weakened social and lateral kin relations, served as an investment in the descendant kin. While neither of the Freeman sisters married, each had a daughter. These children grew up in the shadow of the great house, with all of the privileges and drawbacks that this lifeworld entailed. Archaeological evidence demonstrates that the Matthewses continued to provide porcelain toys to the children of Freemans. One of these artifacts provides some insight into the social aspirations that the Freeman sisters may have held for their children and the love they may have felt for them. A small porcelain soapdish re covered from the site was decorated with a gold band around its rim. A small chip in one corner had damaged pan of the deeotative band IWilkie 1994b, n.d.cJ, and someone had carefully repaired the decoration by re painting that section of the band with gold paint. The bottle of thiS gold paint was also recovered from the Freeman assemblage, indicating that the repair had taken place within the Freeman house. Forgive a moment of archaeological indulgence, and imagine a parent, after a long day cooking or cleaning for the planter family, care fully repainting a thin gold band on a tiny damaged toy by a flickering oil lamp. This single artifact could suggeSt that the occupants had embraced the consumer ideology of capitalism that proclaimed happiness and content ment could be achieved through the possession of fine goods (Leach 19931. At the same time, it embodies the dreams and aspirations of upward mobility that the par ents held for their children.
While the Freeman sisters specifically chose service over farming, their choice was not very different from those of other sharecropping families who took advan tage of circumstances that allowed them to enter the workforce as wage labor. It is clear from the Freeman example, however, that the shift from one labor arrange ment to another can lead to the alienation of individuals from their lifeworlds. For the descendants of these wage laborers, the financial improvements in their lifestyle were tempered by their memories of the lifeworld left behind.
Ironically, even though sharecropping was a labor ar rangement that led to the institution of a system of debt peonage, sharecropping families still maintained some control over their production and were able to focus pan of their household labor on subsistence goods that could be used or traded for other goods IAdams [980, Adams and Smith 1985 , Gaines 197', Maguire 1975 , Mandie 1983 Trade between households was a form of communicative action that aided in the re-cre ation of the lifeworld. Within sharecropping communi ties, certain individuals shifted among various occupa tions, serving as root doctors, preachers, teachers, midwives, or conjurers. The provision of ethnomedical and magical services or education also served to create tighter webs of social relations between individuals and households (Wilkie 19940, n.d.b) . [mpIOved educational opportunities provided a means for individuals to acquire wage labor positions in towns and cities (Lemann 19911 , but in selling their labor families lost those limited op portunities for home production. As the archaeological materials from the Freemans demonstrate, in these sit uations the social relations that had tied communities together were loosened. Families became economically more self-sufficient, but this self-sufficiency ultimately resulted in communal breakdown.
Through recollections and impressions, descendants of the communities at Oakley Plantation conveyed a sense of the paradox in which their families had been en twined. As informed by these community partners, a critical-archaeological interpretation of life at Oakley of· fers an understanding of the perceptions and choices that led to the destabilization of a lifeworld. ThIOugh this insight we can identify possible avenues for emancipa tory action. The course of this research has led to an engaged (relconstruction of the past processes that have shaped the present. The creation of a dialogue between community partners and the researcher resulted in new perspectives on the personal histories of individual fam ilies and their place in the larger context of postbellum change in the rural South. Researcher and community partners realized that human agency, not monolithic forces, had shaped the course of history. Critical-archae ological interpretation relies on this formulation of a dis cursive relationship between past and present, a rela tionship that forms its synthesis, its unity, in the unfolding of the future.
Toward Human Freedom
The intent of this article has not been to review the vast literature related to Marxist-inspired archaeology or ar chaeologists who identify themselves as doing the ar chaeology of capitalism le.g., Brumfiel 1992 , Childe 1936 , Crumley 1987 ' Gibb 1996 , Gilman 1989 Shackel 1993 , Sptiggs 1984 . Our in· tent has been to recognize the variety of ways in which archaeologies that aTe critical in nature can add to a more complex understanding of capitalism and the place of human agency in the modern world. We feel that Critical archaeology represents the best avenue for achieving a dialogue between peoples of the past and the present. We hope that Leone's recent shift from a critical archaeology (Handsman and Leone 1989/ Leone 1988, Leone, Potter, and Shackel 19871 to an archaeology of capitalism (Leone 1995, 19991 does not represent an abandonment of the goal of bringing about emancipatory action through ar chaeological praxis. While the discipline has increasingly embraced the kind of community pannering that would inform a critical archaeology, critical archaeologies have for the most part involved little in the way of praxis. Qur goal has been to revisit and recenter a critical ar chaeology, Yeti difficult questions remain to be an swered. What arc the goals of an emancipatory science such as critical archaeology? And, more important, what is emancipation?
When the obstacles to human freedom arc tangible forms of oppression, focused effon can address the ma terial aspects of suffering. Fetters can be shattered and oppressors punished. However, obstacles such as poverty and racism are intangibles of which only the results are visible. We have emphasized that the structures of so ciety are created and transformed through social rela tions, and we have demonstrated through the case study that a critical-archaeological praxis brings these social relations from the realm of practical consciousness to that of discursive consciousness. We hold that knowl edge of the obstacles to human freedom must be the crucial first step in any attempt to overcome them. This knowledge must be forged through a dialogue in which a critical understanding of the world is formed in discourse. liThe main emphasis of a socialist culture must be on the enhancement of the social consciousness of its Citizens, not only as an awareness of each person's obligations toward the collectivity of others, but even more, as an awareness of the moral priority of society over the rights of its individual members" (Heilbroner 1980:167) . Yet, this reduction of the individual should nOt be considered a call to conformity as much as a strengthening of a social whole. In this view, individual variation is beneficial to society. We must be sure that we do not obscure this individual variation in our ar chaeological constructions of the past by depending too heavtly upon essentialist categories of analysis that ob scure the nuances and complexities of human social relations.
Through a dialogue in which differential positions of privilege are discursively recognized and decentered, in dividuals can come to an understanding of the mental aspect of social relations. As Godelier (r986:r691 has demonstrated, "Every social relation ... exists both in thought and outside of it, and the part which is in thought therefore belongs to thought and is a mental reality." We agree with Godelier that for a social relation to become a material reality, individuals must have some type of mental understanding of the relation upon which to act. While this mental reality may often be part of an individual's practical consciousness, critically informed research should attempt to introduce it into the discur sive consciousness of community partners and scholars , AND BAR TOY A Critical Archaeology Revisited I 76r alike. In discourse, alternative realities may be formed as imagined possibilities that may directly transform so cial realities. "Indeed, around each social relation there exists a series, more or less numerous and more or less elaborated in thought, of other social relations which are in relations of logical transformation with it and exist only mentally. .. In the long run, this practice [the actual initiation of the alternative by individualsJ can profoundly subvert the system" IGodelier 1986:171-72).
However, just as the actuality of oppressive social re lations is intangible aside from its results, the removal of these obstacles to human freedom will also be less than visible. The use of knowledge as a critical force in the attainment of human freedom is a gradual process.
If this process is to be truly critical, it must be discursive.
To be discursive, the process mllSt involve many indi viduals, and therefore it will be prone to fits and starts and will have no predetermined trajectory. One of the fallacies of Marxist perspectives has been the teleology of an evolutionary trajectory toward socialism. Heil broner (19 0:1721 has recognized this as an important crossroads of Marxism:
The answer hinges ... on whether Marxism is ulti mately to be an ideology or a critical philosophy. As an ideology, its usefulness will be spent with the at tainment of its objective.... But Marxism-or bet ter, marxisms-contain the pOSSibility for more than that. A dialectical view of reality, enlarging our view of things with a tension and contradictoriness that is lacking in other philosophic perspectives, should help clarify our knowledge of the world. A material ist view of history will enrich our understanding of the past and of the present, as long as the processes of production playa powerful role in human affairs and exert such enormous influences over the stratifi· cations of society.
In the end, a materialist perspective such as critical the ory does not offer us the solution to the "final drama." Instead, a critically informed praxis places us on a path to bener understanding of the multiplicity of dramas, both past and present, of daily life that will inform the future course of our society. Anthropological archaeology has a unique opportunity to serve as a discursive and reflexive bridge between past and present and remains an arena for further critical action. Wilkie and Bartey criticize those whom they see as re ducing the reality of the capitalist or modern world to an essential set of class and material relations. They be lieve that such an essentialism, which then treats class relations as the motor of history, necessarily fails to lead to an understanding of the human agents who variously reproduce those class conditions, transform them, and rework the material conditions of life. The determinate and abstract descriptions by which modernity is fixed for analytical inspection by some are, for Wilkie and Bar toy, in fact inhabited and thus transformed by the con scious agencies of those who act as least partly according to their own strategic purposes. Classes do not reproduce themselves in abstraction but are made by people living within certain given material conditions.
Comments JOHN C. BARRETT
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The contrasts with which Wilkie and Banoy work are relatively well known and are normally expressed in du alistic terms such as structure and agency or society and individual. The initial problem seems to be whether we are to make a choice analytically between the compo nents of such dualisms or whether we can transcend them altogether. Giddens has attempted the latter in his theory of structuration, and it is the latter course which I assume Wilkie and Bartoy wish to follow. The central thesis of structuration theory is that agency cannot exist outside the context in which it practices the creation of its own history; rather, it makes itself in relation to cer tain structural conditions and, in so doing, also remakes and transforms those conditions. Thus "the constitution of agency and structures are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality. According to the notion of the duality of structure, the structural properties of a social system are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organise" (Giddens 1984:251. This brings us to two crucial components of agency: consciousness and power. Wilkie and Bartoy recognize the importance of the former but arc strangely silent on the latter. Consciousness as an awareness of the world is itself structured by the biological conditions of our bodies and by traditions of knowledge and memories of past experience. These structuring conditions of embod ied "knowledgeability" allow consciousness to be ex pressed in practice. Practice ranges from the non-dis cursive routines of embodied action to the discursively expressed strategies and negotiations of daily life. This means that people can both act within their worlds by "performing" society and express an understanding of those same worlds-that is, have a theory of society (ef. Bloch '985, Strum and Latour 19871. Power most simply is the ability to do work. As we have seen, from the pOint of view of human agency that ability is knowledgeable and is expressed in a range of practices. But work is also applied to something, be it our bodies, the bodies of others, or the material world around us. I would now make three points. First, a knowledgeable and empowered agency can be a collec tivity that has access to common resources and common traditions of knowledge. Second, power is inequitably distributed within a given social formation by virtue of differential access to knowledge and resources. Third, society can become the object upon which certain col· lectivities may attempt to work. Thus we may conceive a degree of systemic integration in which certain groups may recognize their own collective identities and ca pabilities which appear to be ideologically legitimate (William Paca surveying his garden), theorize the social condition (and thus write a constitution), and act upon other collectivities that have been defined at least in part by the discursive practices and power of the dominant group (slaves). I would regard these as class relations.
Class is not merely the epiphenomenon of the routin ized practices of its members, as I feel Wilkie and Banoy come close to implying, nor/ as E. P. Thompson so ably demonstrated/ is it an analytical abstraction. Class is made in the real physical conditions of history through the practices of agencies that have differential access to resources/ act with different degrees of effect upon the world around them, and are stratified in relation to the ways they can work on the identities and lives of others. The extent to which class relations are themselves agents of historical change at anyone time cannot be assumed but demands empirical investigation, and that is the role of the historian and the archaeologist. Where a critical scholarship operates it is to demonstrate how the treatment of collectivities as if they were commod ities and abstractions is an act of violence on lives whose histories and aspirations it is now our duty to tell. Wilkie and Bartoy fail to provide a strong argument for the wide adoption of their approach to critical theory in contrast to that used by an illusory "Annapolis Schoo1." Their epigraph implicitly charges their opponents with laziness and tautology, thus establishing a very high standard which they themselves fail to achieve. Their article is riddled with unsubstantiated assertions, mis characterizations, and quotations out of context. For ex ample, they assert without citation that II many archae ologists ... have come to consider historical archaeology synonymous with the archaeology of capitalism." They further assert that there is an influential /I Annapolis School" of historical archaeology, but, considering the works they do cite, its enrollment seems to number only six or seven. In critiquing this fictitious Annapolis School they make sweeping statements such as that Mullins's recent work does not "adequately [situate] ac tors from different classes in dynamic relationships with one another t ! and that "the Annapolis School has failed to incorporate the experiences of women or ethnic and racial minorities in a way that recognized the unique voices of these individuals," yet Mullins specifically ad dresses the complexities of individual consumer choices by the African-American community in Annapolis given the racist underpinnings of class negotiation (Mullins 1999bl . Even if we were to grant the existence of an IIAnnapolis School," Wilkie and Bartoy completely ig nore the contributions of, for example, Mark Warner 11998), who explicitly analyzed the African·American Annapolitan past, and Elizabeth Kryder·Reid 119981, who has dealt with gender in quite sophisticated ways.
They misunderstand a number of the concepts they use and disarticulate them from their original contexts. In their summary of Bourdieu's concept of habitus, for example, they correctly report that it "recognizes that people's understanding of their cultural environment is uniquely historically situated within their own experi ences," but they overlook the fact that Bourdieu himself considered the construction of habitus to be constrained by an existing class structure. Bourdieu 1197772, my em phasis) States that "the structures constitutive of a par ticular type of environment (e.g., the material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition) produce habitus." Similarly, they disarticulate Giddens's Struc mration theory, which is largely based on the idea that unconscious aspects of social being structure action. They explicitly dismiss his argument that individuals may not be able to articulate why they act in a certain way. This makes sense given their effort to dismiss the possibility that behavior is shaped by shared class conscioLisness.
In claiming the mantle of critical theory Wilkie and Bartoy adopt a perspective that recognizes human action as explicitly political, yet their own political agenda is obscured. For example, they are quick to criticize Leone for decontextualizing his use of critical theory from its political and social context but fail to situate themselves in such a context. Specifically, in discussing the history of the Frankfurt School rhey rightly state that "ideas from [the early 20th centuryl were rather contingent upon their historical milieu... Iwhichl was characterized by an unprecedented class consciousness. Leone's ne glect of this context makes his application of critical theory to archaeology seem rather ahistorical." Yet they make no mention of their own historical and political mIlieu, in which the fragmentation of society, the in creased power of multinational corporations, and the penetration of capitalist social relations into every corner of the world have worked to (reldefine the individual from citizen to consumer. On a close reading, it becomes evident that Wilkie and Bartoy's conceptualization of SOCiety as composed of (semilautonomous individuals in fact contributes to the wider social discourse enabling the Increased accumulation of wealth by agents in the once so-called developed world.
For critical theorists, Wilkie and Bartoy are remarkably uncritical of their own habitus as members of the mid dle-class intelligentsia. For example, they cite as part of the ideology of capitalism "the belief that children will be more successful than their parents." This feature is in fact a unique artifact of the postwar boom in American capitalism, when for a few brief generations this was indeed the case for the middle class. They project this belief back to the turn of the 20th century; one could imagine [he response if one had asked the striking coal AND BARTOY A Critical Archaeology Revisited I 763 miners in Colorado in the days leading up to the Ludlow massacre if they thought that their children, forced to work in the mines from the age of ten, would be better off in the coming years. Those who accuse others of being uncritical of the historical contexts of their assumptions would do well to heed their own advice.
Of the six works that Wilkie and Bartoy choose to cite on the archaeological definition of capitalism, they choose to critique the only one written by an un tenured faculty member, myself IDeHe 1998). In the course nf their critique they wrongly assert that I subordinate agency to class formation. Instead, the bulk of the anal ysis focuses on how individuals constrained by racial oppression struggled to become self-sufficient actors in pre-and postslavery contexts. I fail to see how this differs in anything but jargon from their own stated agenda.
The time may in fact be right to revisit critical his torical archaeology, but Wilkie and Bartoy seem more like academic tourists than serious critics. Troms0, Troms0, Norway (ee2I7@hermes.cam.ac.uk) . 2 v 00
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Critical theory in archaeology is particularly undertheo rizcd, and this is perhaps best exemplified in what Wilkie and Bartoy refer to as the Annapolis School. This "school" is critiqued for concentrating its work on the ideology of capitalist institutions and top-down models of society. Although class is important in this frame work, it is the upper classes which are most often given primacy. It is therefore important that Wilkie and Banoy bring agency, the agency of all individuals in all classes, back into critical archaeology. This article is packed with interesting and thought-provoking discussion, and I have only a few comments.
The case study of two gcneracions of the Freeman fam ily, primarily Silvia and two of her daughters, at the Oak ley Plantation is a biographical narrative that is highly evocative and allows the reader to gain some understand ing of the experiences of these women. Agency is here presented through biography, a method particularly well used in this study, successfully combining archaeology, history, and individual and community memory. Read ing between the lines of the case study it seems clear that members of the Freeman family were not free to make any choices they wished but constrained by rela tions of exploitation and dominacion. In their desire to place agency at the center of the analysis, Wilkie and Bartoy have considerably played down the role of struc ture and the constraints of social relations in their de scription of the experience of the members of the Free man family. Agency in archaeological interpretation is in obvious need of more theoretical discussion not only to explore its complexities but also to explore the link ages between agency and structure.
Wilkie and Banoy translate Habermas's concept of {/lifeworld" into their /lnotion of community" and limit [his to [he meaning and norms of daily life, This seems an oversimplification of "lifeworld," which is situated in relation to both public and private spheres, both the everyday and state systems. Placing both lifeworld and community in the private sphere, with an emphasis on personal relationships, is obviously a way of including agency in critical archaeology, but as a consequence much of the gender-blindness of the work of Habermas IFraser 19891 remains. Perhaps Wilkie and Banoy have chosen to ignore these problems by concentrating their analysis on the female side of the family and on the private, the personal, and the domestic. In the case study, lifeworld is presented as something quite static and un changing, with the Freemans slowly becoming alienated from their traditional way of life. A critical archaeology should resist this tendency to make lifeworld or culture something passive and unchanging. Postcolonial cri tiques Ifor example, Bhabha 1994:19-34) challenge Ihe fixed identities of cultures and focus on dynamic rela· tions, cultural difference, and hybridity-all of which would be most relevant to this case study.
Critical archaeology should be self-reflexive and con· cerned with the relationship between archaeologists and the communities within which they work. Wilkie and Bartoy's article presents an excellent example and chal lenges critical archaeology to engage in this work, both theoretieally and practically. This places demands on all of those involved and is surely not simply a matter of archaeologists' engaging with their public or the local community, of allowing them-the UOther"_to panic ipate in knowledge production. PEDRO Campinas, SP, 13081-970, Brazillpedrofunari@sti.com.brJ. 4 IV 00 Wilkie and Banoy's article should foster considerable discussion among those concerned with epistemological issues relating to archaeology. Several years ago Roben Whallon (198 S:23) pointed to lI a strong atheoretic trend" in American archaeology, and this is in a way still true today for most archaeology worldwide. A theoretical dis cussion is always welcome. Wilkie and Banoy explore some positive interpretive avenues, such as proposing that histOrIcal archaeology not be interpreted only as the archaeology of capitalism (see Funari 19991 and that ar chaeologists work with the community. However, the overall impression is that they take a conservative stance, uncritical of present-day contradictions in soci ety and of archaeological praxis within it.
We live in postmodern times, and postmodernism is "always a radical form of pluralism" ILorenz 1998:6191. If pluralism is characteristic of contemporary life, then clear-cut divisions such as those proposed by Wilkie and Banoy arc unsustainable and clearly artificiallsee Bintliff 1995:34) . The whole article is grounded on a division of scholars into two opposing camps-Marxists, like Leone, and humanists, like Hodder, Shanks, and Tilley. How· ever, the Marxist literature is used by all the writers referred to in the article Isee McGuire 1992:3}, and, fur thermore, as is pointed out by Wood and Powell 11993: 4071, most of them can be described first and foremost as postprocessualists, recognizing that current social and political contexts shape their interpretation of archaeo logical remains. Therefore the proposed dichOtomy is un convincing. Epistemological models are practical and historical constructions IShanks 199;:;41 and should be understood in terms of a social history of theory building (McGuire 1992 (McGuire :2511 In this context, a historical per spective on critical archaeology should be a useful tool for understanding the shaping of an approach. Again, the opposition between class and agency-as if discussion of class would preclude a proper understanding of human agency-is artificial and nOt accepted by the writers crit icized themselves, several of whom are explicit about class and agency as interrelated. Furthermore, Wilkie and Banoy criticize Orser but extensively use his (1988a) work, betraying the inconsistency of their charge that he and Others do not take human agency into account. In their criticism of "Marxists," they argue that gender, race, and ethnicity should be studied, but later they refer to these terms as mere labels. Another dichotomy, be tween individual and societYI characterized as a dialec tical reiationshipi is presented as if surveillance entailed compliance. However, Foucault, who cannot be classi fied in terms of the Marxist/humanist dichotomy, also uses a concept of surveillance and is quoted by self-styled critical archaeologists who also stress resistance. There are thus several ways of criticizing explOitation in so ciety, and the dichotomies proposed by Wilkie and Banoy are grounded in axioms and unconvincing to readers fa miliar with the literature.
Perhaps the main positive contribution of the authors is their plea for collaborative interaction between ar~ chaeologists and their publics. Others, however, have stressed the need for empowerment (Funari 2000:182) , emancipation (Potter 1992:124; Miller and Tilley 19961, critical engagement (Hodder 1991:10) , and transforma tive interaction with people aiming at demystifying power relationships lPaynter and McGuire 1991:91 and transforming social relations in the present IShanks and Tilley 198T172) without necessarily privileging the Out sider as Wilkie and Banoy suggest. On the contrary, their publics seem to be publics in lay and commonsense terms, lacking class interests.
The danger of sidelining class (see Saitta '994:203-41 in the interpretation of society is precisely in overlooking the importance of archaeology as a way of learning about nonelites {Paynter and McGuire 1991:I3}. In historical archaeology, the main emphasis has long been on the material culture of elites (Trigger 1998:161 , and deem phasizing class may contribute to the eulogy of freedom as an abstract, individual, and upper-class concept (Fu nari, Jones, and Hall 1999:II-16 ).
In the end, if it is true that archaeology is still empir icist and unreflexive, reinforcing commonsense and up per-class mores, critical approaches are essential. How ever, condemning different critical approaches as Wilkie and Bartoy do runs counter to pluralism and dialogue (Funari 1996 :3841 and runs the risk of strengthening pos itivism. True pluralism entails that different approaches are valid , and only a teleological understanding of science would enable the authors to condemn Marxism and critical archaeology as outdated. Giddens's agency concept is acceptable as a hermeneutic Begriff, but it cannot rule out other interpretive efforts which are Interested in exposing social contradictions. As It IS presented in this article, archaeology does not denounce exploitation, much less the interests of ar chaeologists in defending the status quo. Is it critical? The proof of the pudding is still in the eating: critical archaeologies are those which do not suppOrt the existing social ordcr. There is much to applaud in Wilkie and Banoy's argu ment for a more intimately drawn relationship between the individual and society-for the "bottom-up" per spective that promotes all social realities as socially con structed. If it isn't exactly new, this GiddensjHabermasj Bourdicu salad-of-an-approach is worth reiterating, especially for archaeological applications where we gen erally encounter archaeological materials as the products of individual efforts or activities or choices. In general, the position is popular and supportable and the work laudable, especially as undertaken with close commu nication between researchers and descendant com munities.
Three things, however, perplex me about this piece. First, I am troubled that it is cast as a rebuke of the II Annapolis School. II Why, we might ask, do the authors choose to reUy Leone et a1. as a "school" instead of al· lowing each of them the very individuality, agency, and individualized relationships [Q broader theoretical "so ciety" that they insist on for their archaeological sub jects? In making this move, we see Wilkie and Bartoy falling IIlto the same trap as the Marxists they criticize, namely, drawing boundaries around similarly consti· tuted subjects and giving them, en masse, a concrete unconstructed reality. This seems superfluous and ironic in the context of an argument that so forcefully rejects the abstraction and reification of social entities lsuch as an /I Annapolis School"l apart from the social relations that construct them.
Second, I find that the agency argued for so forcefully by the authors is ultimately poorly defined and some times conflated with other critiques such as whether previous researchers have paid attention to interactions across class divides or whether age, race, and gender have been recognized in agentic accounts. In the end, Wilkie's own study discovers the Freeman sisters to be seriously "constrained" agents J again chipping away at the power of agency that at firSI she and Banoy want to require. It AND BAR TOY A Critical Archaeology Revisited 1765 also seems hard to argue that the 1/ Annapolis School" has ignored issues of agency when a central study such as the Paca Garden research, cited here in relation to notions of ideology rather than agency, focuses explicitly on deliberate actions taken by individual elites in order to accomplish specific ideological goals; if anything, Le one's study can be faulted for overestimating or over suggesting how ideological positions can be manipulated or constructed by single agents.
My final perplexity arises from the way the descendant groups and other "community partners" appear to have been involved in the research reported here. Presumably, the researchers learned a great deal of history from the contemporary African-American and (?Whitej plantation occupants whose ancestors they are investigating. But it is not clear what this "cooperative effort" ultimately contributes to the community if the goals of research were a priori set by academic concerns and focused, for instance, on questions of practical versus discursive con sciousness. In the end, Wilkie and Bartoy present us with another set of questions: whose goals are these, and how much say did the various "partners" have in setting out the research plan? Who sets the agenda in cooperative research? Are archaeologists prepared to relinquish full control over their research programs? Do all "partners" have a say in how results arc written or in whether or not to critique the Annapolis School-or abandon the Frankfurt School? Are archaeologistS ready to ask, seri ously, what nonacademic communities might want to learn from what archaeology can reveal, putting them selves at the service of these communities rather than incorporating so much of what these communities al ready know into the published results? I have attempted to introduce Marxist theory into his torical archaeology by way of critical theory. My effort has been to adopt a theory that would link past and pre sem and focus on consciousness as a vehicle for change, not on violence, and one that is robust enough to make material culture useful and usable as data. I have at tempted not only to reform a data-ridden and anthro pologically pointless field but also to connect the field to a theory that would explain how we as Westerners got into the condition we find ourselves in now. I am determined to make historical archaeology intellectually powerful enough to be a force for social and political change. Eventually, something along these lines may be achieved by the use of Marxist theory and the modifi cations of it that support democratic action.
Althusser, Habermas, and Freud all concentrated on consciousness because it was the only alternative they could see to violence for creating change. Althusser's work on ideology was useful to me initially because I could use it to find what Binford once called ideotcchnic items, and I found one in the Paca garden. For me the important thing was to locate an artifact that was ide ological. The change which this meant in garden history was that gardens could no longer be seen as unique ex pressions of particular individuals' tastes. For archaeol ogists the much larger issue became whether people saw through ideology's misrepresentation. At the time I had not asked that question, but once I had I realized that people do often see their true conditions and struggle within them. It is not at all clear, however, that they can escape ideology or change their circumstances even if they can see them. To me it is still an open question whether ideology can be pierced for long or effectively.
If that means that I have to see people as in false con sciousness, then those who would so stigmatize me have to deal with the extraordinary resilience of capitalism even while it creates unheard-of differences in wealth among living peoples. For every archaeologist who wants to preserve options of freedom, will, liberty, or agency, there must be the accompanying charge of explaining why people accept impoverishment.
Critical theory via Althusser led to the notion, derived from Lukacs, that consciousness of the origins of one's conditions of existence might lead to change. After many years of effort to use Archaeology in Public in Annapolis, which we began in 1981 (long before any archaeologist in the United States agreed in print or in public that archaeology had a public responsibility to explain how the past was created), I gave up that particular theory as a way of creating a public consciousness. That program failed to change anything in Annapolis, and I moved to an interpretive program derived from Habermas. He pro poses to highlight the existence of local critiques of cap italism among communities not quite gobbled up by cap italism. Called lifeworlds, these are alternative views of how life can be led within capitalism. When highlighted in public, they could raise consciousness-no less an is sue for Habermas than for Lukacs.
Consequently, we focused on the lifeworld of African Americans, well recorded through archaeology and the autobiographical narratives of the 1930S, and it became a vehicle for highlighting a different understanding of life inside capitalism. Mullins's book is a description of this lifcworld and is derived from archaeology, oral his tories, local print sources/ and long-term exposure to life in Annapolis. Since 1990, Archaeology in Annapolis has discovered, published, and widely publicized the depth and extent of Hoodoo, a Central West African religion creolized in onh America, as an answer to the local African-American question: "What's left from Africa?" Our widely available work on African-American life worlds shows how subordinates survive in conditions of intensely hateful long-term racism and yet maintain their integrity. We used Habermas to achieve and think through our scientific roles in finding, adding to, and highlighting this alternative to capitalism. We have suc ceeded in being part of an effort that shows widely that Hoodoo is alive, is a religion, and is not to be dismissed as superstition.
Problematizing the terms used to study capitalism is 
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When scholars criticize the work of their predecessors as being our-of-date, simplistic, or unsophisticated they set very high standards for the evaluation of their own commentary. It must be lucid, sophisticated, nuanced, and current, and it should result in clearly different in terpretations of the social world. This is especially the case when they take on seminal works that have inspired many other researchers. Wilkie and Banoy attempt this type of criticism in their analysis of the work of Mark Leone and his students. Unfortunately, their own cri tique and research do not meet the high standards that they set for the" Annapolis School." This is unfortunate because their goal of building an emancipatory praxis of archaeology is admirable and their commitment to work ing with descendant communities to define this praxis is exemplary. In reading /I A Critical Archaeology Revisited" I often found myself confused as to what theory was being cri tiqued. Wilkie and Bartoy define an "Annapolis School" of historical archaeology. Often this "school" seems to be composed of Mark Leone and his students, but some times it seems to include all explicitly Marxist historical archaeologists. They begin with a quote from John Locke and appear to reject Marxist theory! yet many of the writ ers they draw on (Thompson! Hobsbawm! Godelier, and Heilbroner) are Marxists.
Wilkie and BanDy reject the dominant-ideology thesis that underlies Leone's early work, especially his study of Paca's garden. They correctly point out that it is un likely that Paca's garden duped waged and enslaved workers into a false consciousness that hid from them the reality of their oppression. They seem unaware that others have been raising this same criticism for over a decade IHodder r986, McGuire r988, Beaudry, Cook, and Mrozowski 1991 , Hall 1991 , Johnson 1992 , Orser 1996 , Burke 1999 and that Leone and his students have re sponded to these critiques by significantly modifying their theory, subject, and goals.
Wilkie and Bartoy stress the need to reconceptualize critical archaeology in terms of human agency. They re ject both the idea that social structures determine hu man action and the idea that humans aCt as autonomous individuals. They argue for a dialectical understanding of the relationship between person and society that lies in a notion of constrained agency. This dialectical notion of agency does not seem to be realized, however, in their case study. In this case individuals move between share cropping and wage work, but their mobility does not appear to change the conditions that IIconstrain" their agency. A hegemonic American culture seems to deceive the Freeman sisters imo believing that the poverty of sharecroppers results from individual shortcomings rather than structures of racism. Human action is not simply constrained but comingent or conditional. Social structures, material relations, and ideologies both enable and limit human action. Human action in turn both re inforces and transforms the social reality.
The problems that Wilkie and Banoy have with relat ing person and society are further illustrated in their notion of the descendant community. They essentially confuse the descendants of a community as individuals with a descendant community. In the Freeman example it is clear that these individuals are descended from the plantation communities but not that they form a modern community. Communities are nor simply collections of individuals; they transcend individuals. I can illustrate the concept with our research on the 1914 Ludlow mas sacre (Ludlow Collective n.d.). The descendants of the people who lived in the Ludlow strike camp are by and large middle-class Euro-Americans. The descendant community is the unionized workers of southern Col orado, mainly Chicanos whose ancestors were not part of the 1914 struggle. Both groups maimain the massacre site as a shrine but for different reasons. The descendants use it to memorialize their individual family histories, but the unionized workers use it to reaffirm their iden tity as workers, their solidarity, and their struggle. It is certainly appropriate to work with biological descen dants, but it is not conceptually useful to confuse indi vidual descendants with a descendant community.
Many archaeologists around the world are struggling to build an emancipatory praxis of archaeology. All of our efforts are imperfect and tentative. The forces ar rayed against us are powerful and resolute. II A Critical Archaeology Revisited" engenders debate that will aid us in that struggle by sharpening our conceptual knives, but such debate will undermine our struggle if we use these knives on each other rather than for emancipation. Wilkie and Bartoy lament the social and intellectual fail ures of the /lAnnapolis School" of critical archaeology, whIch has in their estimation ignored human agency, imposed the specter of an all·powerful elite, and over blown capitalism's sway. Yet their attempt to "revisit" AND BARTOY A Critical Archaeology Revisited 1767 critical archaeology grossly mischaracterizes critical ar chaeologies (Annapolitan and elsewhere) and parades a stream of Marxian caricatures to suppOrt its archaeology of conscious experience. Wilkie and Bartoy appropriate a scatter of superficially radical terminology and utterly misrepresent Archaeology in Annapolis and critical his torical archaeologies; in their place they leave an am· biguous historical archaeology that jettisons class, cap itat ideology, and power in favor of a phenomenological vision of self-empowered individuals who could be living in any social system or mode of production.
Using virtually no concrete references that support their interpretation, Wilkie and Bartoy employ tired Marxian stereotypes whose target is really all left-lean ing, Marxian-influenced historical archaeology. Their suggestion that Annapolis archaeologists champion the notion of IIfalse consciousness" is typical of their trans parent scare tactics: no Marxians argue that people are "powerless" to shape their conditions, and indeed, sev eral Annapolis archaeologists have argued against this very suggestion le.g., Little r9940, Mullins 1998). Not even Leone's most systematic analysis of class domi nation implies powerless masses acceding to their own oppression: if they had done so, why would the elite ever have conceded any change whatsoever? Likewise, Wilkie and Bartoy invoke the notion of tOp-down analysis to suggest that Annapolis archaeologies portray people past and present as passive victims whose lives are deter mined by scheming ideologues. Against this backdrop, they elevate the "individual"~itselfan ideological ab straction~to a position that is, at best, loosely related to power relations. When they criticize my book for in· adequately demonstrating class dynamism, they are im plying that class is a fluid experiential identity over whelmingly determined by conscious interaction between nebulous factions. To preserve some modest material basis for class, they equivocally concede un spoken influences~capital? racism? labor rela tions?-but minimize them by ignoring them outside their articulation in experience. Wilkie and Bartoy pre serve critical concepts such as class and capitalism but ignore their profound sway by exaggerating individual agency and conscious experience, a strategy they borrow from Giddens. When they champion Giddens's "discur sive consciousness/' Wilkie and Bartoy place articulate human experience at the heart of archaeology but estab lish absolutely no relationship between experience and tangible structuring mechanisms. They reluctantly con cede that capitalism shapes social life, but they refrain from assertively defining or critiquing capitalism and re· treat to the safe ambiguity of assessing II social relations. II Put this way, conscious experience poses as an essential reality rather than a historical, power-laden subjectivity in itself: Wilkie and Bartoy simply shift deterministic power from the economy to the constructed notion of II experience. If The premise of an IIAnnapolis School" is itself a ten uous construct that Wilkie and Bartoy build to provide a caricatured counterpoint to their perspective. Even if we acknowledge Marxism's genuine impress on Annap· obs archacologies, Wdkie and Bartoy reduce the oeuvre to a monolithic orthodox Marxism. Still more exagger ated is their assertion that Archaeology in Annapolis has Involved no II true praxis": this slights a considerable vol ume of Annapolis research that probes how social iden tity is forged in complex power relations and disregards how contemporary Annapolitans have used/ shaped, modified, and ignored archaeological knowledge over 20 years. They ignore Hannah Jopling's (1998) work with African-American Annapolitansi they fail to recognize George Logan's (1998) or Parker Potter's (1994J public interpretation programsi and they do not cite Mark War ner's !I9981 research on African-American perceptions of class, status, and culture. Perhaps Archaeology in An napolis should do a better job demonstrating it is not the sterile academic venture Wilkie and Bartoy portray; nev ertheless, they completely ignore several key project statements as well as work that would upset their car· ICature, and they specifically refer to JUSt a few sources in passing.
In 1938 Horkheimer stressed that IIwhoever is not will ing to talk about capitalism should also keep quiet about fascism." Experience can indeed critique social life, but if it cannot confront capitalism it can just as well be refuge of conservative ideology. This essay does not II re_ visit" critical archaeology; it offers a distorted recon struction that aspires to dispel left-leaning historical ar chaeology's critique of capitalist oppression and subs titute an ambiguous archaeology of everyday experience. Wilkie and Bartoy offer their ideas about IIrefining ll crit ical archaeology, surely the most robust and promising perspective of taday's modern-world archaeology. Their many misreadings of their colleagues' research and their commitment to forging a neoliberal archaeology/ how ever/ make it impossible to accept the article as a success.
Space limitations preclude a thorough catalogue of their many misstatements. In misrepresenting my ref erence to capitalism as a /lhaunt," for example/ they im ply that I attempted to use the term definitionally. Stat ing that I/capitalism cannot exist apart from human agency'/ and that they "approach capitalism from the perspective of situational behaviors and shifting social relations/' they completely overlook my statement that "capitalism concerns men, women, and children stand mg in relation to others" (Orser 1996: 79J. When they propose that capitalism "should not be viewed as mon olithic" and lire mains in different forms and different guises," they rewrite my statement that I/capitalism was not static, for it wore many faces in the pastlilOrser 1996: 72). My observations were not meant to be revolutionary, and in fact they are so well accepted among archaeolo gists dedicated to examining capitalist fOlmations that Wilkie and Barmy should have remembered them. My point in labeling capitalism a "haunt" was to suggest the many conflicts and contradictions that today's historical archaeologists, enmeshed in capitalism, face when at tempting to investigate capitalist social relations. The same holds true for colonialism/ Eurocentrism, and mo dernity/ because any archaeology of the modern world that is not consciously trivialized by the archaeologist must recognize the powerful but often almost imper ceptible role these post-Columbian ideologies play in shaping and distorting Western scholarship.
Wilkie and Bartoy also seriously mischaracterize Delle's 11998) careful exegesis of social space in planta tion-era Jamaica. By questioning whether the Roman em pire could be construed as a IIcapitalist 'regional' econ omy" they demonstrate that they have either not read, overlooked/ or completely misunderstood Wallerstein, from whom Delle consciously draws. To imply that Delle views capitalism monolithically is seriously to misunderstand the last three-quarters of his book. Equally disturbing is the statement that Mullins's II 999b) exemplary work on African-American consum erism fails to "situate actors from different classes in dynamic relationships with one another. II This state ment is peculiar in that Mullins delves deeply into racial ideology-a clear-cut capitalization of social relations (Friedman 1994:53) -as an irreducible element of Amer ican capitalist life that represents nothing but a "dy namic relationship."
Wilkie and Bartoy's rather unrestrained use of the re search of others is troubling, but equally disturbing is their effort to create a bland, powerless neoliberal his tOrical archaeology. Though they claim to take intellec tual inspiration from Bourdieu, it is actually Giddens on whom they most heavily rely. Their giddy acceptance of Giddens is unmasked most clearly in their willingness to erase the primacy of class, which they naively term a IIcategorical abstraction.
1I Most Marxian scholars are unwilling to degrade the importance of class, and even much in Giddens's formulation is compatible with con temporary and even class Marxian thought (Wright T9 89J. Why are Wilkie and Bartoy interested in reducing class? Giddens/s reason is overtly political. His /lThird Way/' which avidly promotes the '/radical center,'/ is intended to prove the inevitable success of capitalism (Giddens 1998) . He has thus predictably become the in tellectual guru and scholarly apologist of both Tony Blair and Bill Clinton/ as is illustrated by his White House seminars ICallinicos 1999:80J. Wilkie and Barroy even go so far as to champion Giddens's neoliberal understanding of "liberation." To comprehend the true dimensions of this "liberation" one need only consider Blair's shameful handling of the Good Friday Agreement in North lreland or Clinton's happy continuation of the Cuban embargo. Bourdieu, to whom Wilkie and Banoy claim to look for inspiration, has forcefully argued that the /lliberation" proposed by the neoliberals is a charade/ a fatalistic brand of "social neo-Darwinism'/ that serves to equate the con~ servatives' "end of history" with the "triumph of capi talism" (Bourdieu 1998A2J . For him, removing class serves to destroy a collective structure that is "capable of obstructing the logic of the pure market" (p. 961 and merely provides an intellectual rationale for blaming the victims of capitalism for their own personal failures.
The greatest difference between Wilkie and Barroy's II rev isitation" and "classic ll critical archaeology is that practitioners of the latter seek a historical archaeology that critiques the sociohistorical antecedents of modern life. It is an archaeology that strives to illustrate the hisrorical reasons for today's world. The goal of non revisited critical archaeology is not simply to provide a post modern spin on a neoliberal worldview. If critical archaeology is to be remade in the image they propose, then I must paraphrase Marx and categorically state that I am not a critical archaeologist. Nearly ten years ago Barbara Litrle and I (Shackel and Little 1992:6-91 wrOte that we were optimistic about the development and growth of historical archaeology be cause scholars increasingly paid attention to the con cepts of ideology, structure, and meaning. We nOted some of the instrumental people leading this new paradigm, such as Hodder, Miller, Shanks, and Tilley, and we saw the potential influence of those outside of the field, such as Giddens, Bourdieu, and Foucault. We were encouraged by the new ideas of postprocessualism, and we remarked that a discipline really gains maturity when it allows for diversity, controversy, and uncertainty (Shackel and Lit tle 1992:8) . When Wilkie and Barroy use such terms as "troubling" and "disturbing" to characterize the ap proaches used by scholars who work or once worked in Annapolis, I have to wonder about our assessment of the field.
Wilkie and Bartoy have set high standards for their work-to conrexlUalize critical theory and to examine agency in the archaeological record. Unfortunately, their rhetoric is no different from that of the proponents of the ew Archaeology, who criticized anyone who dis agreed with their paradigm. Very much like the ew Right of the 1980s and 1990S that has dominated Amer ican politics, Wilkie and Bartoy have created a divide, an explicit dichotomy of right and wrong, good and evil. They have eliminated any room for grey and uncenainty, and they appear to be intolerant of alternative ways of looking at the past. Their argument comes at a time when there is, in fact, little consensus on what agency acrually means IDobres and Robb 20001.
If Wilkie and Banoy desire to do an archaeology of agency and if they want to contextualize their work, they need to work on different levels. First, they should be concerned about agency and the archaeological record. They have shown one way they could do this work in a plantation setting. Second, they mUSt contextua1lze the scholarship that they hope to improve upon, and if they truly believe in the concept of agency they should look at the work of individual scholars from Annapolis rather than treating them as an undifferentiated whole.
Unfortunately, Wilkie and Bartoy create the IIAnnap olis School" with a single voice and treat the scholarship in an ahistorical fashion. They disregard the develop ment and diversity of ideas within the Annapolis project, and they tend to oversimplify the archaeological research in order to critique it. They ignore Annapolis Pasts (Shackel, Mullins, and Warner 1998) , in which many of the contributors discuss the actions of individuals and groups in the community (Logan 1998 , Jopling 1998 , responses to changing a cultural landscape (Little 1988) , and the town's architecture (Matthews 1988 ). Mullins's (1998 work is an excellent example of how indi viduals and groups react to social tensions. Little 1T988, 1994bl shows how Anne Catherine Green constructed her domestic and work environmen t when she became the head of household. A close reading of these works would help Wilkie and Bartoy construct a more informed argument.
Wilkie and Bartoy also note that lithe actor is elusive" in my work as well. In defense of some of my earlier work in Annapolis, I have shown that material culture is a powerful tool for creating and maintaining bound aries and can be used to create individual and group iden tity. Anomalies in the archaeological record are a result of groups' distinguishing themselves from each other, and this work goes beyond em ulation or top-down mod els IShackel '992, 19931 . I also use archaeology to show how individuals used architecture to Opt out of main tenance relationships, a type of balanced reciprocity commonly found in early historic Chesapeake commu nities (Shackel '994, 1998) . Wilkie and Bartoy rail to notice that while looking at some of the larger issues related to capitalism I have also looked at individual and group responses to capitalism [Shackel 19961 .
I agree with Wilkie and Banoy that I have looked at the forces of capitalism, examined the development of surveillance technologies, and interpreted the struggle between labor and capitaL It would be problematic if any scholar overlooked these larger issues while studying a site that once existed within capitalism. Capitalism is a major force that influenced the archaeological record and influences the way archaeologists interpret their data. It is the goal of every historical archaeologist who does critical archaeology to examine the roots of modern life in order to illuminate the modern conditions of capital ism. Studying, analyzing, and interpreting the archaeo logical record on many different levels can only broaden and strengthen our field. Approaching any subject with one idea or one theory can be a recipe for disaster. An informed analysis should not stop at agency.
Wilkie and Bartoy provide a way of showing agency on a plantation, but because they could have done so without depreciating the work of the many archaeolo gists who at one time performed archaeology in Annap· olis and others who adopt a Marxian approach, I am still optimistic about a diverse and mature historical archaeology. There is much to applaud and to agree with in Wilkie and Bartoy's paper. Their insistence that a critical ar chaeology must remain politically engaged is entirely to be commended, and their historical overview of the work of the Frankfurt School demonstrates the extent to which the principal concerns of Western Marxism changed through time. We should certainly be aware of the changing contexts in which these ideas originated if we are to use them. The principal focus of their argu ment, however, is the claim that certain forms of Marx ist-inspired historical archaeology (characterized here as the 1/ Annapolis School") have come to rely upon a series of analytical concepts which are so abstract as to evict humanity from the past that is being written. Human agency becomes inconsequential in the face of titanic historical forces, structural determination, and the "false consciousness" engendered by irresistible elite ideol ogies.
JULIAN THOMAS
School of Art
There are several distinct elements to what is being claimed here, and it may be helpful to try to pick them apart. The first aspect is a rejection of top-down or to talized models of the sociat and with this I am fully in sympathy. Totalization is a tendency common to both structural Marxism and functionalism, in which social and historical processes are evaluated on a large scale and over the long term, to the extent that singular human beings are barely considered while differences between persons more fine-grained than those of class are disre garded. As Wilkie and Bartoy point out, E. P. Thompson and others of his generation of English Marxist historians rejected this view, insisting that any real understanding of history can only come from a consideration of how it is lived through by embodied human beings. Hence their focus on the concept of experience. In a parallel argu ment, Michel Foucault (I984) suggested a connection be tween totalization and totalitarianism: if we are prepared to write a monumental history from which people have been erased! we will be more likely to tolerate a present in which the deaths and sufferings of human beings can be excused in pursuit of some higher goal.
To this concern with totalization Wilkie and Bartoy add a critique of the "violence of absnaction"-the way in which reified concepts such as ideology, capitalism, and class seem to replace human beings as historical actors. Again, there is much to be said for this argument. Finally, they argue that the necessary corrective for a critical archaeology lies in the consideration of individ uals and their agency. It is at this point that I part com pany with them, for while they present a powerful case against the reification and naturalization of a series of categories of Marxist analysis, they then introduce a se· des of other terms which seem to me to be equally un evaluated and undertheorized: experience, the individ ual, agency, and freedom.
The stress that Wilkie and Bartoy place on the indi vidual is particularly troubling, for there is at present a tendency toward the exorbitation of the individual within archaeology (e.g., Hodder 1999:136-37; Meskell 1996) . Increasingly, "the individual" is being presented as a trans-historic category, a kind of person found in all historical and cultural contexts! and endowed with a set of universal attributes and abilities. This is a somewhat ethnocentric perspective, given that the notion of an au tonomous agent exercising reason and free will is a rel atively recent invention (Carroll 1993) , while many peo ple in the non-Western world do not recognize themselves as or live as "individuals" (Strathern I988: 192; Busby 1997) . To be sure! Wilkie and Bartoy do not suggest that human agents are entirely independent: they are situated in a web of social relations, and they main tain a dialectical relationship with the social whole. Yet the language that they use is concerned with "con straint" and "limitation/' while they present "human freedom" as a matter of removing limitations on the free exercise of the individual!s agency.
What precisely is being limited and constrained here? The answer seems to be "agency." But where does this agency come from? The real problem of the humanist perspective that Wilkie and Bartoy appear to some extent to endorse is that it relies upon human universals as a foundation: "human nature'! is either biologically hard wired or mystically conferred upon the person (Heidegger 1993) . The human subject appears to be a given-an ir reducible social atom which enters into a dialectical re lation with {/the social," which in turn unavoidably be comes an exteriority. The consequence of this is that "agencyl/ becomes conflated with "the individual" and "structure" with i1 society." We need to rethink agency as a relational quality rather than a prerogative of an individual which seems to issue out of the person (Barrett 2ooo:6I) . Similarly, we need to recognize that the ability to act in relation to others is conferred upon us by virtue of our social positioning-what Butler (1997) refers to as the "enabling violation."
Wilkie and Banoy have presented a cogent argument against the dehumanization of the past, but their exten sive theorization involves no discussion of subjectifica tion! the historically specific process by which self-in terpreting and acting human beings are engendered. In the absence of this, "individuals" take on an essential ized and decontextualized character. The danger is that in resisting the totalization implicit in some forms of Marxism! Wilkie and Bartoy may fall into the arms of something far worse: the free-agent! rational-choice per spective of the New Right. We are gratified that so many of our colleagues took the time to respond to this article. We apologize H, in our efforts to be succinct, we left some of them with the sense that we had misrepresented the content of their work. Likewise, we did not intend to overemphasize or underemphasize the work of any particular individual. We are pleased that this forum has given our colleagues the opportunity to clarify their positions on agency, class, and liberation. This is part of the service that the CUR RE:-"T ANTHROPOLOGY format provides in encouraging scholarly debate.
In speaking of the" Annapolis School" we were fol lowing the lead of Matthew Johnson (19991, who uses the term in Leone's 1999 edited volume, Historical Ar chae%gies of Capitalism. We felt that the appellation of "school" was appropriate for a body of literature that recognized common concerns and theoretical commit ments. We intended the term to be honorific rather than pejorative and apologize to any of our colleagues who prefer not be considered part of any particular "school."
In writing this article, it was our intent to recognize what has become a powerful intellectual influence within historical archaeology. Leone, more so than any other scholar, has brought critical discourses to the fore front of our discipline, fighting to create, as he says, a "historical archaeology Ithat isl intellectually powerful enough to be a force for social and political change." It is our opinion that by injecting greater consideration of human agency and constructions of difference (Moore 1994) which include but also go beyond analyses of class a stronger politically motivated archaeology can be forged. Inter-and intraclass dialogues and struggles can not be understood in isolation from discourses on race, sexuality, gender, and ethnicity. We continue to believe that these are aspects of the human experience that tend to be devalued in many Marxist analyses jsee Johnson 19991.
We would like to take this opportunity to reiterate and clarify our conceptualization of several of the terms key [Q this work, including "agency" and "the individual," and our use of structuration theory.
It is clear from Thomas's comments that he is reading our '{individual" as "individualism." Meskell (1999:9) argues that the conflation of these two very different social constructions is common in the archaeological lit erature. Thomas is correct in noting that the philosophy of individualism that defines a person as an (lautOno mous agent exercising reason and free will" is an inven tion of recent Western origin and not a "trans-historic category" that should be applied indiscriminately in ar chaeological contexts. Instead, Meskell's 11999:9) defi nition of the individual as "a single person as the fount AND BARTOY A Critical Archaeology Revisited 1771 of agency, consciousness, interpretation and creativity in cultural and social life, by virtue of his or her sole own ership of discrete, corporeal, sense-making apparatuses" better represents our notion. Since, as historical archae ologists, we are often working at sites where known his torical individuals lived, we believe that this definition underscores that we are studying materials used and left by unique persons who interacted with family members, community members, friends, and foes in ways that were influenced not only by the structuring influences of the larger society and the routines of their lived experiences but also by their own outlooks, desires, and ambitions. In her social atchaeology of ancient Egypt, Meskell[19991 forcefully demonstrates the value of archaeological anal yses that treat individuals as more than "micro versions of larger social entities" (p. 20).
For a critical archaeology, a focus on the individual in this way can be a powerful tool, for it is at the level of personhood that immediate emotive connections can be made between past and present actors. Individuals such as Anne Frank, Ishi, and Sojourner Truth are icons sym bolizing the broader experiences of their cultures, but they have become the focus of intense historical interest and scrutiny becausc the uniqueness of thcir personali ties attests to their shared humanity. Our "individual," therefore, is not the construction of an ethnocentric per spective but rather a recognition of our shared human ity-a condition that crosscuts time and cultural bound aries. Many feministic archaeologies have already demonstrated the interpretive power of recognizing the diverse faces of past peoples le.g., Franklin 1997Q, Gem and Conkey 1991 , Joyce 2000 , Meskell 1999 , Spector 1991 , Tringham 1991 Individuals under any definition do not exist in a social vacuum, and with Meskell (1999) we recognize that any archaeological study of the individual should consider the social as well. In this way we can avoid constructing narratives that cither are overly particularistic or gloss over the diversity of human experience and losing sight of the fact that individuals in the past could work to effect social change. It is in this light that we find Gid dens's strucruration theory a useful tool, given its em phasis on recursive relations between the social and the individual. The idea of routinization emphasizes, for us, that social relationships and interactions are not only experienced but also performed and in these perform ances structures of inequality can be experienced, cre ated, re-created, contested, masked, and even ignored.
We recognize that our view of agency may not agree with that of others. We accept that human action is often constrained by society and social obligations in ways of which actors may be conscious or unconscious. How ever, we propose an agency that does not require con scious selection among alternatives. This is a deliberate claim, not a mistake, on our part and does represent a difference of opinion with some of the commentators. A review of the literature on agency in archaeology in fact demonstrates a range of opinions in this regard (e.g., Bell 1992, Dobres 2000, Dobres and Robb 2000, Dobres and Hoffman '994, Johnson '989, Saitta 1994 )· We are pleased to sec, from these comments, that the Idea of community parrnering is becoming entrenched In archaeological practice, although we may still debate issues such as how to decenter our authority, how to balance our obligations to different sectors of the de· scendant community and the public, and so on. Follow ing the lead of other scholars researching the African American past (e.g., LaRoche and Blakey 1997, Edwards-Ingram 1997 , we tend to favor as inclusive a model as possible.
Only in this way can we prevent our own biases from driving or otherwise shaping the discourse. In the course of dialogues with descendant communities, new, excit ing, and unexpected avenues of research and interpre tation have opened up for us, and this reassures us that the discourses are free-flowing between participants and not covertly shaped by our research interests. While the need for discourses between academics and the public(sJ may be most VIsible in African-American archaeology (where so many of the scholars are of European descemJ, it is equally present when we study the expcriences of other communities, even those of which we may per sonally consider ourselves members. Archaeologists should not only encourage members of the descendant communities to use them as a voice but also urge them to becomc trained in the human sciences, thus becoming voices of authority themselves. Theoretical perspectives that draw upon experiential understandings of the world demand experiential diversity among practitioners.
A truly critical archaeological praxis must not limit itself to archaeology. Critical archaeologists must strive for an integrated social science centered around key is sues in order to utilize the power and privilege still ac corded to scientific discourse in our country (e.g., Becker 1971:156, Berreman 1981:296, Wallerstein et al. 1996: 103-51 . We muSt always remember that lithe center of anthropology is everywhere, and its circumference no where" (Becker 197r:941. Perhaps we need to rhink be yond defining abstractions such as capitalism and class solely in terms of archaeology and begin to question the larger issues of social inequality and difference from the perspective of a unified science in the service of humanity.
The arenas in which social scientists can work to effect social change arc primarily in the intertwined realms of government and public opinion. Over 40 years ago, C. Wrighr Mills (1959: 51 suggesred rhar scholars redirect their work toward erecting a II qua lity of mind that will help Ipeoplel to use information and to develop reason 1I1 order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in the world and of what may be happening within themselves." Social scientists, archaeologists included, need to be more aggressive in seeking om the media and policy makers with data and interpretations that have critical relevance and resonance against status quo un derstandings of the world. The mass media in particular remain a powerful and untapped resource for the pre sentation of socially aware archaeologics. Through the introduction of the "logic of intellectual life, that of ar gument and 1efutation" [Bourdieu 1998 :]1, to the public sphere, social scientists can become democratic catalysts for the creation of dialogues based on rational under standings of the social world. In this way, we may use our positions to "create the conditions for a collective effort to reconstruct a universe of realist ideals, capable of mobilizing people's will without mystifying their con sciousness" (Bourdieu 1998:7) .
Despite some commentators' strong objections, there are several points at which we seem to agree. Several welcome our attempt to inject a discussion of agency into critical theory, recognizing that abstract categories, particularly class, have been used to subsume the diverse voices of the human past. While the commentators seem to disagree regarding the degree to which the Annapolis School has incorporated feminist perspectives, there does appear to be acceptance of the notion that they are es sential. Vie certainly seem to be in agreement that ar chaeology has the potential to be a strong tool in the struggle for social change.
We see our research as an attempt to study inequality in all of its guises throughout time, with particular em phasis on how inequality intersects with difference (e.g., Moore 1994, di Leonardo 19911 . Socially engaged ar chaeology, as an aspect of an integrated social science, needs to create dialogues that cross historically contin gent boundaries of difference. These dialogues must be directed toward social change and social action through focused efforts in the realms of public policy and public opinion. Our work represents a fundamental difference in that we open critical archaeology to dialogues not solely reliant on the issue of class. We believe an inclu sive critical archaeology as a key component of a more humane science should address the totality of human experience with the immediate goals of social action and social change. It is essential that critical archacologies not only critique structures of power but also work to ward a democratic transformation of the status quo to the benefir of all of humanity.
